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“The final arbiter of the quality of your work is not the client, the
judge, or any external truth, it’s the partner you’re working for.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The environments in which we practice law shape our
understandings of what it means to be ethical and professional.2
Our practice environments, most significantly our workplaces,
influence the roles we assume vis-à-vis our clients and the
assumptions, values and beliefs that frame our ethical decision3
making—in other words, they shape our ethical consciousness.
*
Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. I am indebted to
many people who have assisted me in the course of this project. First I am
grateful to my long-time teacher, mentor, and friend, Robert Jackall at Williams
College. I could not have undertaken this project without his generous
guidance, advice, and honest feedback. I am also grateful for comments on
earlier drafts from Jerry Kang, Thomas D. Morgan, and Bryant Garth. I also
want to thank my friends and colleagues Christopher Johnson and Sophie
Sparrow for their comments, feedback, and unfailing support and my research
assistants Julee Flood, Suzanne Ketteridge and Sarah Montgomery for their
valuable assistance. Finally, I want to thank the lawyers who agreed to
participate in this project. They have been generous with their time, open and
thoughtful about their experiences, and committed to helping me “get it right.”
It has been my privilege to know and work with them. All of the opinions and
mistakes expressed here are mine alone.
1. A former summer associate speaking about the experience of working
in a large law firm. My empirical research involved one-on-one interviews with
twenty-two lawyers practicing in ten large firms. Unless otherwise indicated, all
quotes from lawyers in this article are from the interviews for this study.
Lawyers’ names have been changed to protect their identity. See infra Part IV
for a full description of my methodology.
2. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of
Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 177, 179 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context,
Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 955,
956–57, 969 (1999); David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling
Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND
TROUBLE CASES 68, 71 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
3. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 969–70 (positing that professional
environments quickly eclipse the role of law school in shaping lawyers’ beliefs
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As a result, one lawyer can regard as unethical conduct that
another lawyer, practicing in another setting, may see as
uncontroversially appropriate. Although many scholars have noted
the significance of the link between lawyers’ workplaces and their
ethical consciousness, empirical research exploring that
4
relationship is relatively scarce. In this article, I report my
preliminary findings from my ongoing empirical investigation of
that link.
Using large law firms as my sample, I investigate how
bureaucratic legal workplaces “transform lawyers’ ethical sights.”5
I start with the assumption that we must learn how lawyers
6
“actually experience their work” to understand how it influences
and values).
4. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New
Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 1, 3 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (noting
the lack of research into “[h]ow lawyers in various organizational and
institutional locations throughout the profession see the contexts in which they
operate, define the interests they pursue, and perceive the obligations they must
honor.”); Rostain, supra note 2, at 963, 969–70 (arguing that “[s]ociolegal
investigations are . . . necessary to develop a much richer account of the role of
professional environment in shaping lawyers’ commitments and beliefs.”); Mark
A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, Villanova University School of Law,
School of Law Working Paper Series, Paper 13, 2004, at pp. 101–02, 114–15,
(suggesting we must understand the social contexts in which the lawyers
involved in recent corporate scandals worked in order to understand whether
regulations designed to change lawyer conduct will succeed). Robert Nelson’s
study of lawyers working in four corporate law firms in Chicago reported in
Partners with Power discussed in text accompanying notes 97–116, and the
Ethics: Beyond the Rules study sponsored by the Litigation Section of the
American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation, discussed in text
accompanying notes 124-128, are two notable exceptions. ROBERT L. NELSON,
PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW
FIRM, 5–6 (1988) (exploring the influence of corporate clients on the values of
the lawyers who represent them) [hereinafter PARTNERS WITH POWER].
Lawrence J. Fox, Nancy McCready Higgins & Donald B. Hilliker, Report:
Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 FORDHAM L. REV., at 691 (1998) (investigating
what I refer to here as the “working ethics” of large-firm lawyers) [hereinafter
Ethics: Beyond the Rules].
5. Rostain, supra note 2, at 957.
6. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE
MANAGERS 5 (1988) (describing his approach to the study of the moral ethos of
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their ethical consciousness. This is, therefore, an interpretive
account of how large-firm lawyers view their work.
Through in-depth interviews with lawyers working in some of
the country’s largest law firms,7 I identify the “set of rules,
premiums, and sanctions that [large-firm lawyers] create and re8
create” to guide them as they endeavor to survive and advance in
their firms. I argue that when large-firm lawyers make decisions in
which ethical concerns are implicated, they are likely to make
those decisions according to the logic of their firms. 9 If I am
correct, this has profound consequences for the profession.
Understanding how bureaucratic legal workplaces shape
lawyers’ ethical consciousness is especially important now, as
increasing numbers of American lawyers work in bureaucratic
settings including large law firms, “business corporations,
government agencies, mass-market legal service chains, and
rationalized court systems.”10 Among these, I chose to study large
law firms because they are quintessential bureaucratic legal
workplaces. As they have grown over the last three decades, large
corporate managers) [hereinafter JACKALL]. In Moral Mazes, Jackall gives a
rich and nuanced account of the experience of managers working in large
corporate bureaucracies, and the influence of that experience on their moral
consciousness. An early report of Jackall’s study was first published in the
Harvard Business Review. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: Bureaucracy and
Managerial Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1983, at 118.
7. See infra Part IV for a description of the lawyers I interviewed.
8. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 112.
9. Id. I use the phrase “logic of their firms” to refer to what Jackall
labeled “institutional logic,” which he defined as:
the [c]omplicated, experientially constructed, and, therefore
contingent, set of rules, premiums, and sanctions that men and
women in a particular context create and re-create in such a
way that their behavior and accompanying perspectives are to
some extent regularized and predictable . . . . [A]lthough
individuals are participants in shaping the logic of institutions,
they often experience that logic as an objective set of norms.
And, of course, [managers’] own fates depend on how well
they accomplish defined goals in accordance with the
organizational logic of their situation.
Id.
10. Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal
Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 857 (1998).
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firms have become increasingly bureaucratic in structure,11
mirroring their corporate clients. Unlike corporations and many
government agencies that are organized by non-lawyers for other
purposes, however, large law firm bureaucracies are organized by
lawyers for the sole purpose of providing legal services.
Sociologists have long theorized that bureaucracies shape the
thinking of the individuals who work within them in distinctive
ways.12 Empirical studies have tested and refined this theory.13
One of the most widely respected of these studies, Robert Jackall’s
Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate Managers,14 has served as a
11. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 857–58 (noting that lawyers working
in large law firms are “experiencing a significant bureaucratization of their
professional workplaces” and “experiencing an unprecedented degree of both
commodification and supervisory control.”); see also PARTNERS WITHOUT
POWER, supra note 4 (describing the transformation in both size and complexity
of the large law firm).
12. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN
MIDDLE CLASS (Oxford Univ. Press, 1951); WILLIAM A. WHYTE, THE
ORGANIZATION MAN (Simon and Schuster, 1956).
13. See, e.g., JACKALL, supra note 6, at 11, and sources cited therein at
235–38 summarizing theoretical and empirical works on bureaucracy.
14. Jackall’s Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate Managers has
achieved wide acceptance. It is well regarded in sociological circles and is used
in the curriculum of many business schools. See, e.g., Syllabi in business school
courses: Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, Management 422 Term
2, 2004, Power and Politics, available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/larrick/
management 422/files/PP%20syllabus202004.pdf; Wharton School of Business,
LGST 210 Corporate Responsibility and Ethics Honors Version, available at
http://download.wharton.upenn.edu/download/pub/lgst/syllabi/spring2004/lgst
210.301.pdf; MIT, Fall 2001, Professor R. Gibbons, available at http://www.
people.hbs.edu/rgibbons/945_Syl_9+14.pdf-supplemental result, and Syllabi in
sociology courses: Sociology of Complex Organizations, Sociology 412, Fall
2001 Minnesota State University, Professor Olday available at http://www.
mnstate.edu/scj/olday/Soc 412/Syllabus.Htm-30k and Sociology V3100,
Introduction to Social Theory, Professor Polletta available at
http://www.sociology.
columbia.edu/undergraduate/academics/courses/v3100.pdf. It has been cited by
legal scholars numerous times as evidence of what is happening in large
corporate bureaucracies. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational
Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons
of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002); Lawrence E. Mitchell and
Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a
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model for my study of lawyers working in large law firms.15
Jackall concludes that work in American corporate bureaucracies
shapes corporate managers’ habits of mind in characteristic ways
and that those habits of mind, in turn, shape managers’ moral
consciousness.16
Similarly, based on the first phase of my research, I conclude
that work in large law firm bureaucracies shapes lawyers’ habits of
mind in distinct ways. Large-firm lawyers work in a world where
the relevant norms change frequently. Implicit in the opening
quote, “The final arbiter of the quality of your work is not the
client, the judge, or any external truth, it’s the partner you’re
working for,” 17 is the interviewee’s understanding that lawyers
working in large firms must respond to varying sets of norms in the
course of their work. What constitutes high quality work varies
depending on the lawyer’s supervisor. The proper writing style for
one partner may be spare and legalistic while another prefers more
literary prose. One partner may prefer to maintain friendly and
accommodating relations with opposing counsel, while another
adopts reserved and suspicious stances. One partner may want
responsive documents produced upon request unless strong
arguments exist for withholding them, while another may want
documents withheld on any arguably non-frivolous ground unless
the other side moves to compel their disclosure.

Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2002).
15. Numerous legal scholars have suggested that research, akin to
Jackall’s research with large corporations, be done in law firms. See, e.g., Robert
Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and the “Middle Ground,” 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075,
2088, n.41 (1993); Robert Granfield and Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a
Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with
Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495 (2003); Donald C.
Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853 (1995);
Sargent, supra note 4, at 112.
16. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 119 & 191–204. I use the term “habit of
mind” here in the sense that Jackall uses the term in Moral Mazes, JACKALL,
supra note 6, at 119. The term refers to the patterns of thinking that individuals
develop in response to their experiences in, and the incentives created by, the
social structures in which they work.
17. A former summer associate was speaking about the experience of
work in a large law firm. See supra note 1.
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The degree of variation in the norms at play in large law firm
bureaucracies makes the experience of work in large firms
fundamentally different from that in small firms and plays a crucial
role in shaping large-firm lawyers’ unique habit of mind.
Although lawyers working in small firms often begin their careers
working for other lawyers, and, therefore, must also respond to
varying norms, they typically begin working autonomously
(without supervision) earlier in their careers than do large-firm
lawyers. As a result, small firm lawyers begin selecting their own
norms relatively early in their careers.18 In contrast, many largefirm lawyers work for other lawyers, and thus must respond to the
varying norms of their supervisors, for much of their careers.
Further, as large firms have grown larger and more culturally and
geographically diverse and as lawyers move from one firm to
another, the norms espoused by the powerful lawyers within these
firms have become more varied.
In addition to pleasing the various lawyers who provide them
with work, large-firm lawyers (in contrast to small-firm lawyers)
must also meet the expectations of a growing group of lawyermanagers in their firms’ management hierarchies. The norms
espoused by the lawyer-managers who run large firms tend to
change with some frequency. For example, firm management may
espouse as a norm the ideal that litigators should see themselves as
rainmakers. After hiring a consultant, however, firm management
may change the prevailing norms to reflect a new strategic plan
that envisions litigators as service providers to other practice
groups in the firm.
Because norms vary among the powerful partners within a
firm and over time, lawyers working in today’s large law firms
19
employ a characteristic “choice of norm” rule to guide them.
Like a choice of law rule that says the law of the state where an

18. Certainly, small firm lawyers may look to others for guidance about
what norms to adopt, but I am suggesting they have an opportunity early in their
careers to make choices about the content of the norms they adopt. For a report
of a wonderful preliminary empirical study of small and solo firm practitioners,
see Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 309 (2004).
19. See infra Part VI for a definition of choice of norm rule.
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auto accident occurs is the source of governing law in a tort claim
arising out of the accident, large-firm lawyers’ choice of norm rule
identifies the source of norms a lawyer should follow in a
particular situation if he wants to act in accord with the logic of his
firm.
Large-firm lawyers’ choice of norm rule reflects the varying
norms at play in large firms: the appropriate norms to apply in a
given situation are those of the people the lawyer is working for
20
and with at the time. Because this choice of norm rule makes the
partner or coterie a lawyer is working for at the time the source of
norms, the lawyer asks, “What norms would the partner or coterie I
am working with follow in this situation?”
The choice of norm rule large-firm lawyers employ is a
critical component of the distinctive, “social, cognitive, and
evaluative frameworks”21 large-firm lawyers develop to negotiate
their careers in large firms. As a consequence, across large firms,
lawyers approach their work in characteristic ways. Further, I
argue here that large-firm lawyers are likely to approach the moral
and ethical dimensions of their work in these same, characteristic
ways—employing the same social, cognitive and evaluative
frameworks, including the choice of norm rule, they follow in
other aspects of their work. I am not suggesting that large-firm
lawyers’ ethical norms are identical across firms or even within
firms. Rather, I argue that the choice of norm rule that shapes
large-firm lawyers’ approach to moral and ethical issues is likely to
be the same across firms.
Because the choice of norm rule in use in large-firm
bureaucracies makes the norms lawyers follow highly mutable,
large-firm lawyers place great importance on their own ability to
discern the norms appropriate to the situation. As a result, their

20. Law schools arguably prepare law students to adopt the choice of
norm rules I identify here. Most of us who teach have heard law students talk
about tailoring exam answers to what particular professors want. In Making
Elite Lawyers, Robert Granfield notes that law school pedagogy forces students
to “reconceptualize their consciousness in ways that are compatible with the
professional culture.” ROBERT GRANDFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS VISIONS
OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 1992).
21. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 11.
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habit of mind22 is to focus on which norms to follow when, rather
than on the content of the norms themselves. In other words, the
large-firm lawyers’ habit of mind is to discern the norm
“appropriate” to the situation, not to judge the merits of any given
norm. If large-firm lawyers carry this habit of mind into their
approach to ethical and moral issues, it will shape their ethical
consciousness in very distinct ways: A habit of mind that focuses
on identifying what norms others would follow rather than on the
content of the norms themselves will “convert principles into
guidelines, ethics into etiquette, [and] values into tastes.”23 Indeed,
in a world where what norms one follows depends on what norms
one’s superiors would follow, principles can only be guidelines,
ethics can only be etiquette, and values can only be tastes.
If other choice of norm rules prevailed in large firms, the
proper source of norms with respect to ethical and moral issues
might be the applicable code of professional responsibility or a
lawyer’s own sense of morality and propriety. A lawyer working
in a world where the choice of norm rule directs him to consult
fixed or internal sources of norms is likely to understand ethics and
morals as rooted in principles or values. In contrast, the choice of
norm rule and associated habit of mind I found at work in large
law firms encourages a consciousness that understands ethics,
morals, principles and values as mutable—i.e. as guidelines,
etiquette and tastes.
The choice of norm rule I identify at work in large law firms is
similar to the evaluative rules that Jackall found managers employ
in large corporate bureaucracies. I argue that the choice of norm
rule large-firm lawyers follow is a function of the peculiar
bureaucratic structure of large law firms described below. If I am
correct, the increasing bureaucratization of lawyers’ workplaces
has significant implications for debates about ethics and
24
professionalism.

22. Id. at 119.
23. Id. at 204.
24. I suspect the habits of mind lawyers develop in large government and
nonprofit bureaucracies will be somewhat different than those of lawyers
working in large law firms. A full understanding of the role of bureaucracy in
shaping nonprofit and government lawyers’ ethical consciousness will require
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I introduce my argument here as two equations: first,
bureaucracy generates a characteristic choice of norm rule; second,
this choice of norm rule encourages a morality characterized by
organizational pragmatism rather than principled decision-making.
I begin this way in an attempt to distill the relationship between
large-firm bureaucracies and ethics. However, in my quest for
clarity, I have greatly oversimplified the workings of large law
firms as social institutions. In describing my empirical findings in
Sections IV through VII below, I hope to more accurately reflect
the complex, fluid, and richly nuanced workings of the human
institutions that are large law firm bureaucracies.
I begin in Section II with a description of Robert Jackall’s
study of managers in large corporations and the role of
bureaucracy in shaping managers’ moral consciousness. In
Section III, I review the recent legal scholarship on large law
firms. Section IV outlines my methodology. In Section V, I
describe the characteristic social structures of large law firms.
Section VI describes the conflicts, tensions, incentives, and
motivations created as the marketplace exerts pressure on these
bureaucracies. Against the backdrop of the structure of large-firm
bureaucracies, and the conflicts and tensions created as these
bureaucracies compete in the marketplace, I examine in Section
VII the experience of individual lawyers working in these firms.
Through the voices of the large-firm lawyers I interviewed, I
describe the organizational logic that guides them as they navigate
their way through the complex social terrain of their bureaucracies.
Finally, in Section VIII, comparing my observations with those of
other scholars, I link, in very particular ways, the organizational
logic at work in large firms with the ethical consciousness of the
lawyers working in them.
II. THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN SHAPING CORPORATE
MANAGERS’ ETHICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
In Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate Managers, Robert
Jackall explores how bureaucracy shapes corporate managers’
empirical study of the peculiar form of bureaucracy developed in those
organizations.
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moral consciousness.25 He finds that the rules corporate managers
develop and follow in their quest “for survival and success are at
the heart of what might be called the bureaucratic ethic, a moral
code that guides managers through all the dilemmas and
vicissitudes that confront them in the big organization.”26 Jackall
reports on managers in three companies: a chemical company and
its parent conglomerate, a large textile company, and a large public
relations firm.27 Jackall conducted more than 140 interviews of
managers working in these corporations.28
Through these
interviews he identifies:
[t]he actual evaluative rules that managers fashion
and follow in their work world, the rules that govern
their stances toward and interaction with their
superiors, subordinates, and peers; their friends
allies and rivals; their business customers and
competitors; regulators and legislators; the media;
and the specific publics they address and the public
at large.29
The “evaluative rules” Jackall describes are among the
“experientially constructed . . . set of rules, premiums, and
sanctions”30 managers create and recreate to guide them through
their work lives. He notes that, while managers play a role in
“shaping [these rules, premiums, and sanctions], they often
experience [them] as an objective set of norms.”31
Among the complex set of “evaluative rules” Jackall identifies
are what I have labeled “choice of norm” rules. Jackall examines
“the particular conceptions of right and wrong, of proper and
improper, that underpin those rules”32 and asks “how the social and
25. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 205.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 15.
28. Id. at 205.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 112 (referring to these rules, premiums and sanctions
collectively as the “institutional logic” of large corporate bureaucracies).
31. Id. at 112.
32. Id. at 4.
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bureaucratic context of [managers’] work—the warp across which
the threads of their careers are stretched—shape their occupational
33
moralities.” He concludes that bureaucratic work encourages a
distinct set of evaluative rules.34 These rules and the habits of mind
managers develop as they try to understand and follow them shape
35
corporate managers’ moral consciousness in characteristic ways.
By examining the evaluative rules managers follow and the habits
of mind they develop, Jackall provides a rich and highly nuanced
account of the role of bureaucracy in shaping corporate managers’
moral consciousness.
Jackall begins Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate
Managers with a description of the unique characteristics of
36
He describes them as
American corporate bureaucracies.
37
“hybrids,” part Max Weber’s “pure form” bureaucracy and part
“patrimonial bureaucracy.”38 Bureaucracy in its pure form as
envisioned by Weber is:
characterized by a kind of legalistic objectivity, by
close attention to details and to orders, by adherence
to standardized procedures, by thorough written
documentation of daily business in well-maintained
files, by impartial and fair treatment under law, by a
consequent impersonality, and by a separation of
39
offices from persons.
Although American corporate bureaucracy has incorporated
many of the “structural features of [the] pure form [of]
bureaucracy,” Jackall finds it also has “many of the features of
personal loyalty, favoritism, informality and nonlegality that
marked crucial aspects of the American historical experience.”40
Thus, power in American corporate bureaucracies is personal and,
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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as a result, managers’ personal relationships with their superiors
are of preeminent importance.41
Once they reach a certain level in the corporate hierarchy,
Jackall found that managers do not believe their further
advancement will depend on their performance.42
Instead,
“managers see success depending principally on meeting social
criteria established by the authority and political alignments—that
is, by the fealty and alliance structure—and by the ethos and style
of the corporation.”43 In order to understand those social criteria
and make decisions, managers develop the habit of mind of
“looking up and looking around.”44 They look up to those above
them on the corporate ladder and around to those in their various
social networks to understand the rules-in-use that guide behavior
45
and decision-making among their superiors and peers. They look
up and around to ascertain what “public face”46 to present.47 Thus,
managers must “master[] the social rules that prescribe which
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 35–40.
Id. at 45.
Id. Jackall introduces his study with a question:
What if men and women in the big corporation no longer see
success as necessarily connected to hard work? What
becomes of the social morality of the corporation—the
everyday rules in use that people play by—when there is
thought to be no fixed or, one might say, objective standard of
excellence to explain how and why winners are separated from
also-rans, how and why some people succeed and others fail?
What rules do people fashion to interact with one another
when they feel that, instead of ability, talent, and dedicated
service to an organization, politics, adroit talk, luck,
connections and self-promotion are the real sorters of people
into sheep and goats?
Id. at 3. My research indicates the lack of fixed standards and the role of
“politics adroit talk, luck, connections and self-promotion” in sorting the
winners and losers in the quest for advancement has resonance for many largefirm lawyers working their way up the partnership ladder.
44. Id. at 77.
45. Id. at 37–40, 59–62.
46. “External appearances, modes of self presentation, interactional
behavior, and projection of general attitude together constitute [a manager’s]
public face.” Id. at 46.
47. Id. at 37–40, 59–62.

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

644

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 4

mask [public face] to wear on which occasion.”48 The public face
appropriate in one situation (e.g., in a meeting with one’s boss and
his/her allies) may not be appropriate in another (e.g., a meeting
with managers outside this coterie).
The skill of looking up and around is challenged by the
49
Frequent
contingent nature of power in large corporations.
reorganizations and shake-ups mean that power is constantly being
redistributed in corporate bureaucracies.50 New CEOs are anointed
and they reorganize to show the financial markets they are
aggressively making changes.51 New divisions are bought, existing
divisions are reorganized and numerous managers are fired.52
One’s boss is assigned a new position. As power changes hands,
or as those at the top find it expedient to change the norms in use,
managers must recognize when and how the norms, including
norms of public face, have changed.53
Successful managers understand the choice of norm rules—
54
they know whose norms are appropriate to the situation. They are
also adept at noting a change in the prevailing norms.55
Accordingly, successful managers develop certain characteristic
habits of mind: They look up and around, they are flexible and
able to adapt their styles as needed, and they pay close attention to
perceptions.56 They understand how they need to be perceived and
57
are able to accurately assess how others see them.
Those who make their way to the highest rungs of the
corporate ladder shape the norms that filter down through their
organizations.58
For instance, Jackall reports that when
“reorganizations in the chemical company brought new circles of
48. Id. at 46.
49. Id. at 59–61.
50. Id. at 24–25, 33, 67, 73, 134–35.
51. Id. at 25.
52. See, e.g., id. at 25–33.
53. Id. at 21–23, 59–61.
54. Id. at 59–61.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 59, 75–100.
57. Id. at 59, 64, 203–04. Jackall concludes that this necessitates a
particular form of narcissism. Id. at 61.
58. Id. at 36.
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managers to power . . . . [t]he notion of ‘lean, hungry, and
aggressive management’ became the watchword and the bonhomie
59
of the old regime became dangerous.” Thus, the style norms in
the corporation change to reflect the styles and philosophies of
those in power.60 Some of the norms that come from the top may
have moral or ethical dimensions.61 For instance, a new CEO may
“espouse policies of product responsibility, tying organizational
rewards to sustained vigilance over the uses and possible uses to
which a product might be put. Such programs thus try to link
individual success, reduction of corporate liability, and consumer
safety.”62 But the norms that come from the top of the corporate
hierarchy are subject to the choice of norm rules managers
follow.63 Jackall’s work suggests that it is these evaluative rules—
the rules I have labeled “choice of norm rules,” not the norms
themselves, that play the crucial role in shaping managers’ moral
consciousness.64 The choice of norm rule reflects the lack of fixed
65
norms. It places a premium on the ability to read the prevailing
norms and apply the norms appropriate to the situation.66 Thus, in
corporate bureaucracies “morality does not emerge from some set
of internally held convictions or principles”67 or even from the
norms being generated and disseminated from the top.68 The
appropriate norms to apply in a given situation, whether they are
style norms or moral norms, are those of “some person, some
coterie, some social network, some clique that matters”69 to the
manager at that time, in that particular situation.

59. Id. at 61.
60. Id. at 58–61.
61. Id. at 198–201.
62. Id. at 199. Perhaps these policies are the genesis of the proliferation
of warning labels on products that warn against seemingly farfetched potential
uses. Id.
63. Id. at 192.
64. Id. at 191–204.
65. Id. at 191–94.
66. Id. at 192–94.
67. Id. at 101.
68. Id. at 192–94.
69. Id. at 101.
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Jackall describes the fate of a manager in one of the
corporations he studied who failed to understand or to follow the
choice of norm rules and the reactions of other managers to his
plight.70 Brady, an accountant, discovered various financial and
accounting irregularities in his company, including bribes paid to
foreign officials, doctored invoices, and manipulation of the
company’s pension fund.71 He attempted to report his discoveries
up the ladder and to the company’s general counsel over a period
72
of months. When Brady refused to ignore the problems after
being asked to do so by a colleague sent to “cool things down,” he
was fired.73 Brady saw his predicament as a moral one.74 He told
Jackall:
So what I’m saying is that at bottom, I was in
jeopardy of violating my professional code. And I
feel you have to stick up for that . . . . I am
frightened of losing respect, my self-respect in
particular. And since that was tied with my respect
for my profession, the two things were joined
together.75
Other managers Jackall interviewed saw Brady’s situation as
“devoid of moral and ethical content.”76 In their view:
[H]e violated the fundamental rules of bureaucratic
life . . . . (1) You never go around your boss. (2)
You tell your boss what he wants to hear, even
when your boss claims that he wants dissenting
views. (3) If your boss wants something dropped,
you drop it. (4) You are sensitive to your boss’s
wishes so that you anticipate what he wants; you
don’t force him, in other words, to act as boss. (5)
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 105–11.
Id. at 105–07.
Id. at 106–08.
Id. at 108–09.
Id. at 109.
Id.
Id.
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Your job is not to report something your boss does
not want reported but rather to cover it up.77
Brady refused to follow what I have labeled the choice of
norm rule of the corporation, which required him to look up and
around to understand what his boss would deem proper conduct
and to follow his boss’s norms. Instead, he looked to his
professional code as the source of norms. Jackall says:
Brady refused to recognize, in the view of the
managers I interviewed, that ‘truth’ is socially
defined, not absolute, and that therefore
compromise, about anything and everything, is not
moral defeat, as Brady seems to feel, but an
inevitable fact of organizational life. They see this
as the key reason why Brady’s bosses did him in.
And they too would do him in without any qualms.78
Jackall concludes that the ethos managers in large
corporations:
[T]urn principles into guidelines, ethics into
etiquette, values into tastes, personal responsibility
into an adroitness at public relations and notions of
truth into credibility. Corporate managers who
become imbued with this ethos pragmatically take
their world as they find it and try to make that world
work according to its own institutional logic.79
Since an increasing numbers of lawyers work in bureaucratic
settings, we must understand whether the growing number of legal
bureaucracies shape lawyers’ moral consciousnesses in similar
ways. Because lawyers and the work they do differ from corporate
managers and their work in important ways, we cannot assume
large law firm bureaucracies have the same effects. Most notably,

77.
78.
79.

Id. at 109–10.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 204.
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lawyers are required to comply with a code of ethics.80 Further,
even large corporate law firms—the legal bureaucracies that have
the most in common with, and work for, large corporations—differ
from corporate bureaucracies in other significant ways. The CEO
of a corporation serves at the will of the board of directors and
shareholders. In contrast, although large law firms are now usually
managed by one or a small group of powerful partners, those
managers serve at the pleasure of those they manage—the other
equity partners in the firm. In my study, I set out to learn how the
peculiar form of today’s large law firm bureaucracies shape the
moral consciousness of the lawyers who work in them.
III. THE STUDY OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
I do not begin my study of today’s large corporate law firms
on a blank slate. As they have grown larger and more
bureaucratic, these firms have become a particular focus of study.81
Legal scholars have addressed a number of important theoretical
and empirical questions that have deepened our understanding of
these workplaces. As yet, however, no one has systematically
investigated how the bureaucratic structure of these firms shapes
lawyers’ ethical consciousness.
Much of the recent scholarship on large law firms is
theoretical and views large firms through the lens of law and
82
economics analysis. In their seminal study of large firms, Why
80. Many scholars have noted the weak enforcement of professional
codes. See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, Symposium Introduction: The Future Structure
and Regulation of Law Practice: Controlling Behavior: the Sources and Uses of
Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 878–82, 890
(2002) and sources cited therein. When lawyers’ professional codes are
enforced, scholars and the popular legal press have documented that solo
practitioners and small firms “are disciplined at a far greater rate than other
lawyers.” Id. See also Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Small and Solo Law
Firm Practitioners, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004).
81. In contrast to small firms, large firms have been the focus of more
than their share of scholarly attention. See Leslie C. Levin, Symposium:
Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of Solo and Small
Firm Practitioners, 70 FORD. L. REV. 847, 848 (2001) and sources cited therein.
82. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Firms
get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large
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the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and
the Growth of Large Law Firms, Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay
used law and economic theory to explain the growth and structure
of large law firms.83 Galanter and Palay argue that the exponential
growth of large law firms over the last century was driven by their
structure, which the authors describe as a “promotion-to-partner
tournament.”84 According to Galanter and Palay, large-firm
partners use associates to maximize partners’ surplus human
capital—their ability to generate more legal work from their
relationships with lucrative clients than they can do themselves.85
To maintain the value of their human capital, partners must ensure
86
that associates produce a high volume of quality work.
Galanter and Palay posit that firms use a promotion-to-partner
tournament as a monitoring mechanism to encourage associates to
work hard and provide high quality legal services to their clients.87
Partners lose money if they have to spend significant time closely
88
By
supervising associates’ work beyond an initial period.
deferring some of the associates’ income until partnership and
challenging them to compete for a limited number of partnership
seats, large firms create incentives for associates to produce a large
volume of quality work with little supervision.89 Galanter and
Palay argue that the promotion-to-partner tournament necessitates
that large firms grow exponentially, because as the number of
partners grows, the firm must increase the number of associates to
replace those who are promoted to provide the new partners with
90
associates to do their work.

Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding and Information
Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581
(1998).
83. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 82.
84. Id. at 766.
85. Id. at 770–73.
86. Id. at 773–76.
87. Id. at 780–83; Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1584.
88. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 779–82.
89. Id. at 780–83.
90. Id. at 783–89.
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David Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati reconceived Galanter and
Palay’s tournament theory to account for a number of anecdotal
and preliminary empirical findings that appeared inconsistent with
classic tournament theory.91 In the course of their studies on the
role of race in large law firms,92 Wilkins and Gulati find that not all
associates participate in the tournament, and that the selection of
partners is not based on past performance as a “rank order”
tournament would suggest, but on forward-looking criteria.93 They
also find that the partnership tournament is not played on a level
playing field; associates are tracked and seeded94 from the outset
for the coveted training assignments that ensure a group of
95
associates are trained for partner-like work. Also, the partners
who declare the winners and losers of the promotion are not
neutral, i.e., they have a stake in who wins.96 Further, Wilkins and
Gulati argue that Galanter and Palay’s theory does not recognize
the pivotal role human and relational capital play in determining
who wins and who loses the tournament.97
A number of other scholars following in this vein employ law
and economics theory to analyze other aspects of large law firms,

91. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82. I say “appeared inconsistent” here
because in A Little Jousting about the Tournament, Galanter and Palay argue
that some of these findings were new and that others were not inconsistent.
Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, A Little Jousting About the Tournament, 84
VA. L. REV. 1683 (1998).
92. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1586.
93. Id. at 1586–87, 1606, 1620–24.
94. Firms track associates as they move through the multi-round
tournaments from junior to senior associates competing for choice training
assignments and the “associates” who do well in early rounds are favored and
protected in later rounds. Id. at 1643–58. Associates are seeded (selected at the
outset for choice training assignments) on the basis of pedigree (“signaling”),
i.e., law school, class rank, law review membership and judicial clerkship. Id. at
1651–58.
95. Id. at 1641–44.
96. Id. at 1615–19.
97. Id. at 1657–60, 1669–70. Human capital refers to a lawyer’s ability
to generate more work than she can do herself as a result of her native
intelligence, her legal education and skills, her professional reputation and her
relationships with clients. Galanter & Palay, supra note 83, at 768.
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including the role of race in large firms.98 As Wilkins and Gulati
note, “[t]here are, however, limitations on the usefulness and
reliability of these [law and economic based] accounts. For the
most part, this work is theoretical, rather than empirical, often
relying on anecdotal evidence from the legal press.”99
In contrast, Robert Nelson in Partners with Power, employed
the empirical tools of sociology to investigate the structure of large
law firms.100 More than fifteen years since its publication, Partners
with Power still represents the most thorough and systematic
empirical study of large law firms to date. From 1979-1981,
Nelson studied four large Chicago law firms; two that were
101
traditional in their structure and two that were bureaucratic. In
labeling firms as traditional or bureaucratic, Nelson looks at three
criteria: (1) policy making and strategic planning, (2)
administration and monitoring of data, and (3) the organization and
stability of work groups.102 Policy making in traditional firms is
103
“ad hoc and reactive” while in bureaucratic firms a “specialized
policy making group . . . actively engages in strategic planning.”104
Traditional firms do not have full-time managers and do not
engage in systematic “monitoring of internal performance
measures or financial information,”105 while bureaucratic firms do.
And finally, in contrast to traditional firms, bureaucratic firms have
“well-defined work groups” with leaders who report up a
management ladder.106

98. See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms, An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 515
(1996) (combining rational choice theory with a recognition of the role played
by “professional ideology, social capital and inequality”).
99. Id. at 543 (placing their work in this theoretical/anecdotal tradition
while acknowledging the limits of this form of argument and describing the
preliminary empirical research they used to supplement the publicly available
information).
100. See PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4.
101. Id. at 92.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 91.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Nelson asked why the bureaucratic firms had adopted
bureaucratic structures and how they differed from the traditional
107
firms. He concluded that the bureaucratization of large firms “as
a means of improving service to clients and increasing partnership
profits appears to be in the economic self-interest of the clientresponsible elite.”108 He found that the bureaucratic firms, like the
traditional firms, were dominated by a small group of partners who
had relationships with the firm’s most important clients.109 Thus
the firms’ adoption of a bureaucratic structure had not changed the
essential nature of power in those firms.110 Further, Nelson found
that
although work and careers have changed
significantly as firms grow and become
differentiated, the model of professionalism
continues to be the independent practitioner . . . .
Individual lawyers choose their roles (the field they
work in, the partners they work for, the hours they
work) and are ultimately responsible for their
111
personal success or failure in the organization.
Nelson went on to posit a theory of social change to explain
how these firms reconciled their bureaucratic structure with
traditional notions of professionalism.112
He argued that
professional “values relating to organizational policies arise inside
the firm and reflect the managerial ideology of the elite in
power.”113 While bureaucratic structures clashed with much of the

107. Id. at 17, 25–29.
108. Id. at 225.
109. Id. at 224–28, 288–89.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 278. This notion of professionalism is akin to historic notions
about the role of merit in determining who succeeds in large corporations.
JACKALL, supra, note 6, at 3, 7–16. My findings suggest that, like managers in
corporate America, many lawyers working in large-firm bureaucracies no longer
believe that responsibility for their success or failure within their firms is
ultimately within their control.
112. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 23–24.
113. Id. at 220.
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traditional rhetoric of professionalism, those firms that successfully
adopted bureaucratic structures reinvented professional ideology to
114
An example illustrates
rationalize the structures they imposed.
his point. The notion that a lawyer was free to choose the field(s)
he worked in and to move from field to field as he desired was
central to traditional notions of professionalism.115 In one of the
bureaucratic Chicago firms Nelson studied, incoming associates
were required to join a specific department at the outset rather than
explore a variety of practice areas.116 The ideology of the firm
espoused by its dominant partners was that professionalism
connotes a high degree of competence and competence requires
specialization.117
Lawyers cannot produce the high quality
professional work their clients demand unless they specialize.118
Accordingly, Nelson concluded that “[p]rofessionalism did not
determine the organizational practice, but was constructed within
each firm according to its particular history and the interests of its
most powerful partners.”119
Building on Nelson’s earlier work in Lawyers’
Ideals/Lawyers’ Practices, Nelson and David Trubek suggested an
interpretive framework for the study of the areas of the legal
profession “that integrates studies of structural and organizational
changes with studies of the reactions and perceptions of the actors
120
involved in the changing systems.” They argued that:
[P]rofessional ideals [are] formed partly within the
workplace and partly as designed consciously or
unconsciously, by lawyers for the promotion of
their economic, power and status goals. Thus
“ideals” carry within themselves heavy traces of
what we have called “structure.” But they also can
114. Id. at 205–07 (summarizing Nelson’s findings in PARTNERS WITH
POWER).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Nelson & Trubek, supra note 2, at 207 (summarizing Nelson’s
findings in PARTNERS WITH POWER).
120. Id. at 22.
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be seen as a set of dispositions that have a logic
partially independent of the structures that produce
them. They may, therefore, become the object of
competition among individual or collective actors
who seek to appropriate (or perhaps accommodate)
elements of a professional tradition in order to
advance a particular mode of professional
organization or pursue other objectives.121
Many of the scholarly works discussed above express concern
about how the structural changes large law firms have undertaken,
and the changes in the markets they serve, affect the ethics of
large-firm lawyers.122 The organized bar and the popular legal
press have expressed similar concerns.123 In response to some of
these concerns, a number of prominent legal and social science
scholars working in this area participated in Ethics: Beyond the
Rules, a project sponsored by the Litigation Section of the
American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation,
designed to study large-firm lawyers’ ethics.124 In 1998, the
study’s authors conducted extensive group and some one-on-one
interviews with nineteen lawyers working in large firms in two
cities.125 In these interviews, the researchers asked large-firm
litigators to talk about their understandings of their roles vis-à-vis
their clients, what it means to act ethically, and their professional
ideals.126 In a series of essays published in the Fordham Law
Review, the researchers paint a vivid picture of large-firm lawyers’
ethics.127 Although the Ethics: Beyond the Rules scholars posit

121. Id. at 23.
122. See, e.g., Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, The Transformation of
the Big Law Firm, LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES, 31–33 (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Fox, Higgins & Hilliker, Ethics Beyond the Rules
Historical Preface, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 699.
123. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, et al., Ethics Beyond the Rules:
Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORD. L.
REV. 697, 701 (1998).
124. See Ethics: Beyond the Rules, supra note 4, at Historical Preface.
125. Frenkel, et al, supra note 123, at 701–02.
126. See id. at 691–895.
127. Id.
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some of the structural and market roots of large-firm lawyers’
ethical stances, they do not systematically investigate the link
between the structure of lawyers’ practice environments and their
ethics.128
In this article, I combine my findings about the logic of large
law firms with both my preliminary findings about large-firm
lawyers’ ethics and the Ethics: Beyond the Rules scholars’ data
and draw conclusions about the links between the structure of large
firms and lawyers’ ethical consciousness. I do not posit theories to
explain why large firms are structured as they are or how large
firms re-make professional ideologies to rationalize their
structures. I take the structure of these firms as I find it and ask
how that structure affects lawyers’ ethical consciousness.
As Nelson and Trubek’s proposed interpretive framework for
the study of the profession suggests, we need to understand how
the structure of lawyers’ workplaces affect their perceptions and
how lawyers’ perceptions, in turn, affect the structures of their
129
To do this effectively, we must undertake empirical
workplaces.
studies capable of capturing this complex and dynamic process.
As Robert Gordon noted in 1993:
[T]here is very little as yet written about law firms
that gives a good feel for how market and
organizational
structures,
career
patterns,
professional self-images, firm cultures, financial
pressures, patronage networks and power
hierarchies—running from clients to partners and
partners to associates—condition how lawyers see
their jobs, self-interest, loyalties, obligations, and
practical moralities, and how these conceptions play
out in their work.130

128. Id.
129. See Nelson & Trubek, supra note 2, at 213–14.
130. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the “Middle Ground,” 91
MICH. L. REV. 2075 n.41 (1993) (citing Moral Mazes as “a wonderful study of
business corporations in this vein”).
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Unless we understand how careers in bureaucratic law firms
shape the ethical approaches of the lawyers working in them, we
cannot determine whether the changes in the structure of large
firms and the markets they service are a cause for concern, and if
they are, how to effectively address them.131
There are several reasons why the sort of interpretive
sociological study Jackall undertook in large corporate
bureaucracies has not been undertaken in large law firms. First, it
is difficult to do. Empirical work of this sort requires access to
large-firm lawyers across the country and the time for lengthy,
one-on-one interviews. Second, an early attempt in this direction
may well have discouraged further study. Erwin Smigel’s The
Wall Street Lawyer, Professional Organization Man?, published in
1964, was an empirical study of lawyers working in what were
large Wall Street law firms in the mid-to-late 1950s.132 Smigel
asked whether work in those law firm bureaucracies “breeds
conformity and stifles creativity.”133 He concluded that, although
Wall Street lawyers were “expedient conformit[ists]” in their
“nonprofessional styles of life” like dress and residence, they had
adopted the norms of the profession which value creativity and
independent judgment.134
While Smigel’s work was widely accepted and cited outside
135
legal academics roundly rejected his
legal scholarship,
conclusion as suffering from flaws typical of functionalist
analysis.136
A number of scholars “criticized these early
131. Scholars have proposed new mechanisms for policing ethics and
establishing ethical cultures in large law firms. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS (Harvard
University Press 1998); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.Wilkins, A New
Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 SOC. J. LEG. ETHICS 535. We need to
understand how lawyers in large firms experience their work in order to predict
whether these mechanisms will be effective.
132. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER, PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? (The Free Press of Glencoe 1964).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 338.
135. See, e.g., PARTNERS WITHOUT POWER, supra note 4, at 6 (citing
Ouchi and others).
136. Functionalist analysis argues that professional “institutional structures
are driven by the functions they were designed to implement.” Wilkins & Gulati,
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explanations by arguing that ‘professionalism’ was merely the
label under which law firms pursued their economic self137
interest.” Nelson argued that Smigel “presents an idealized and
incomplete model of the social structure of the professional
firm.”138 Smigel “mistakenly read this form of domination
[collegial hierarchy] as a lack of domination.”139 Nelson notes that
Smigel found fewer rules in the Wall Street firms he studied than
he expected given their bureaucratic structure.140 This, Nelson
argued, led Smigel to conclude that large firms had no need for
extensive rules because large-firm lawyers had “internalized
common standards of practice”141 (namely cannons of ethics) and
that there was “little need to define the division of labor or to
articulate powers attached to different positions in the firm’s
142
Nelson notes, “In Smigel’s conception everyone
hierarchy.”
knows his or her place; there is little conflict, little need to justify
the distribution of power and profits.”143 Smigel concluded that the
collegial organization of the large Wall Street firms he studied
allowed them to maintain autonomy from their clients’ interest.144
Nelson’s empirical findings flatly controvert Smigel’s
145
Nelson concluded that as a result of his failure to
thesis.
understand the “system of collegial domination” embedded in large
law firms’ structures, Smigel underestimated the importance of
these hierarchical relationships in understanding large law firms.146
Nelson noted that it is the partners who control the firm’s
relationships with its most powerful clients who sit atop the firm
hierarchy. Based on his research he predicted these partners

supra note 82, at 493 n.60. Smigel asserted that professional norms dictated the
structure of large law firms. SMIGEL, supra note 132, at 338.
137. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 514.
138. PARTNERS WITHOUT POWER, supra note 4, at 15.
139. Id. at 16.
140. Id. at 13–14.
141. Id. at 14.
142. Id.
143. Id
144. Id. at 14–15; SMIGEL, supra note 132, at 338.
145. PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 205–90.
146. Id. at 16.
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can be expected to have internalized the client’s
perspective on questions of social and legal policy.
In such a collegial hierarchy the interests, indeed,
probably the tastes, of clients will be enforced. The
resilience of collegial authority in the law firm will
have the opposite effect from that posited in the
professions literature. Instead of producing an
organization that is more autonomous from client
interests, collegial authority ensures that even as the
organization becomes more specialized internally
and moves in the direction of bureaucratic
organization, it will remain under the control of
147
clients.
My empirical research confirms many of the theories and
assumptions of Galanter and Palay, and Wilkins and Gulati, about
the way large law firms work and about the incentives of the
lawyers who work in them.148 Moreover, many of Galanter and
Palay’s predictions in 1990 about what large firms might look like
in the future are borne out by my research.149 Although large firms
are exponentially larger and substantially more bureaucratic than
they were when Nelson wrote Partners with Power, my research
also confirms Nelson’s thesis about the nature of power in large

147. Id. at 227–28.
148. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 82; Wilson & Gulati, supra
note 82. For example, Galanter & Palay theorize that large firms will become
increasingly hierarchical in order to facilitate monitoring of the quality of their
work product as large firms grow. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 807. My
empirical research confirms that large-firm bureaucracies have become
increasingly hierarchical. See text accompanying notes 177–92. Wilkins and
Gulati posit that large firms measure candidates for limited partnership slots
against some “absolute standard of [human and relational] capital that translates
into potential for the future,” and that that standard is shaped in part by external
factors such as the market for one legal specialty over another. Wilkins &
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1654, 1660–61. My research suggests that the external
market factors often trump all other factors in the partnership decision. See text
accompanying notes 227–28.
149. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 807 (describing “the
‘Later’ Big Firm”).
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law firms.150 My findings are consistent with Nelson’s conclusion
that the dominant partners in large firms play a crucial role in
setting the norms and creating the ideology that rationalizes those
norms.151 My study also confirms Nelson’s prediction that the
benefits of bureaucratization would drive more and more firms to
152
adopt bureaucratic structures.
By adopting a methodology similar to Jackall’s, which has
proven useful in providing insight into corporate bureaucracies,153
I will explore how the bureaucracies created by the “partners with
power” in today’s large firms shape the habits of mind, including
the ethical consciousness, of the lawyers who work in them.
Although I take a more sociological approach, my findings are
not inconsistent with the law and economics scholarship described
above. As Cass Sunstein has argued, “[I]ndividual rationality is a
function of social norms. The costs and benefits of action, from
the standpoint of individual agents, include the consequences of
154
acting inconsistently with social norms.” Thus, if one subscribes
to rational choice theory, an understanding of large-firm lawyers’
choice of norm rules (Sunstein might call them “choice of norm”
norms or procedural norms) is necessary for any understanding of
the costs and benefits of action.
In addition, I hope that my research makes two new
contributions to this body of work. First, I describe the rules largefirm lawyers develop to negotiate the bureaucratic structures
developed by the firm’s dominant partners. Second, I posit that the

150. See PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 113–19.
151. See supra notes 112–21, 145–47.
152. See PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 281–82.
153. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm,
76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 490 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Symposium: The
Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility
and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 970–71 (2002) (citing
Jackall’s study reported in Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers as
evidence of managers in large corporations approaches to the business and
ethical issues they confront); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A
Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 91 (2003).
154. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 909 (1996).
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rules, including the choice of norm rule, and the habits of mind
lawyers develop working in large firms155 are similar to those
Jackall identifies in large corporate bureaucracies. Thus, I argue
that the rules that guide large-firm lawyers and the habits of mind
that follow from these rules are largely a function of large law
firms’ collegial bureaucratic structure.156 Finally, I argue that the
rules and habits of mind that large-firm bureaucracies encourage
shape large-firm lawyers’ ethical consciousness in distinct and
important ways.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Beginning in the spring of 2003, I began interviewing lawyers
working in large law firms. My empirical research is on-going. In
this article, I report on the first phase of interviews. This
preliminary report of my findings is based on my one-on-one
interviews with twenty-two lawyers practicing in ten large law
firms. These firms ranged in size from approximately 160 lawyers
to over 1,000 lawyers.157 They were located in large cities on the
east and west coasts, and in the south. All but five of the lawyers I
interviewed were litigators. I conducted all but two of my initial,
in-depth interviews in person, spending from an hour and a half to
three hours with each lawyer. I conducted follow-up interviews
with six of these lawyers, some in person and some by telephone,
during which I asked them to interpret the material I was
collecting. In total, I conducted thirty interviews.
The lawyers I interviewed included junior and senior
associates, salaried non-partnership track lawyers, non-equity, and
equity partners.
A number of them had management
responsibilities in their firms. They included a team leader, several
practice group leaders, a department head for a large metropolitan
155. See infra note 233–40 and accompanying text.
156. As Nelson noted, the partners in large law firms with relationships
with powerful clients dictate the management structure of large firms. NELSON,
supra note 4, at 16, 112.
157. Five of the firms were among the fifty largest firms in the country,
and all of the firms were among the largest 250 law firms in the country in 2003,
according to the National Law Journal. The NLJ 250, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 24,
2003, at S10.
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office, a firm-wide department head, and a former managing
partner. I also interviewed a third year law student who had been a
summer associate at a large law firm during the summer of 2003.
Sixteen of my interviewees were men and six were women. Two
interviewees were Asian-American; one was African-American; all
others were Caucasian-Americans.
The lawyers I interviewed were not chosen at random.
Instead, I used personal connections to gain access to large-firm
lawyers. I asked friends, colleagues, and former colleagues to
suggest large-firm lawyers with whom I could speak. Some of
these lawyers made initial calls to lawyers they knew and asked
whether I could contact them. Others gave me the name of a
lawyer and told me to use their names when I introduced myself
and my project. Some of the lawyers I interviewed introduced me
to still other lawyers. All of the lawyers I interviewed spoke with
me on the condition that they and their firms remain anonymous. I
have changed all names, and sometimes other identifying
information, including in some instances gender information, to
protect the identities of those lawyers and their respective firms.
With one exception, I found the lawyers I interviewed to be eager
to talk about their work and lives in large law firms. I took
handwritten notes of my interviews and subsequently typed them
myself or had them typed for me.
The sample of lawyers involved in my study is not intended to
be statistically representative. However, the twenty-two lawyers I
spoke with had diverse professional backgrounds. Some had spent
their entire careers in the same firm; some had come to their firms
as lateral associates or partners. They also had diverse practice
concentrations.
Notwithstanding these differences, their
geographic diversity, and the range of seniority and managerial
responsibilities represented, my in-depth interviews revealed
remarkable consistency in these lawyers’ experiences of work in
large law firms.
Within large firms, I focused my initial research primarily on
158
I did so for two reasons. First, litigators’ working
litigators.
ethics represent an exceptionally influential paradigm of legal
158. The next phase of my empirical research is focused on transactional
lawyers.
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ethics; non-litigators adopt litigators’ adversarial norms even when
their work does not involve adversary proceedings.159 As David
Luban noted, “Lawyers commonly act as though the standard
conception [the duty of a lawyer in an adversary proceeding to
zealously represent his client’s position] characterizes their
relationship with clients even when the representations do not
involve the courtroom.”160 Thus, understanding how the logic of
large law firm bureaucracies shapes litigators’ working ethics may
indicate how the increasing bureaucratization of legal workplaces
shapes the working ethics of non-litigators as well.161 In addition,
large-firm litigators are actively engaged in the ongoing
discourse—the regular dialogue among plaintiffs’ lawyers, defense
lawyers, clients and the court—by which litigation ethics are
162
Understanding the organizational
defined and redefined.
influences on large-firm litigators is, therefore, essential to
understanding the development of litigation ethics. Second, I
focused on large-firm litigators because doing so allowed me to
build upon data in the Ethics: Beyond the Rules study, which was
focused on litigators.163
In conducting these interviews, I tried to understand how these
large-firm lawyers viewed and experienced their work. I asked
them about their interactions with colleagues within the firm, as
well as with clients and adversaries. I asked who succeeds in their
firms and why. I also asked them how they make decisions. In
159. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 57–
58 (1988).
160. Id. at 57 (arguing that the standard conception of the lawyer’s role as
a partisan advocate who is not morally accountable for his actions only applies
in the context of litigation and that the principles of partisanship and nonaccountability should not apply when lawyers work outside of an adjudicatory
proceeding) (citing Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 672 (1978)).
161. In my own research, I did not find differences in the ways litigators
and non-litigators in large firms experience the worlds of their firms.
162. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 867 (noting that “[l]itigation ethics do
not exist in the abstract, but rather are constantly being constructed from
litigators’ day-to-day routines. Standards of conduct come from neither
individual attorneys nor from individual firms, but rather from the larger system
of the profession as a whole”).
163. See Ethics: Beyond the Rules, supra note 4, at 692.
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response, they told me stories, a number of which are recounted
here.164 The social, cognitive and evaluative rules large-firm
lawyers develop and live by emerge from these stories. It is these
rules that, I argue, are likely shaping lawyers’ ethical
consciousness.
V. THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
To understand how large-firm lawyers experience their
worlds, one must first understand the social structure of large law
firms. How is the firm’s work organized? Who reports to whom?
What kinds of decisions need to be made, and who makes them?
Although every firm is unique, and although large-firm lawyers
believe that their firms differ substantially in terms of their culture,
the structure of the bureaucracies that have developed in these
firms is remarkably similar. As noted in Part III above, a number
of other scholars have described the general structure of large law
firms and referred to many of the specific features of large-firm
165
structure in the course of their work. In this section, I describe in
some detail the common structural features of the firms I studied in
2003 and 2004. Because I posit that the structure of large firms
influences lawyers’ ethical consciousness, I endeavor to provide a
more comprehensive description of the structure than is contained
in much of the earlier scholarship. Most of what I describe here is
generally consistent with that scholarship; however, many of the
firms I studied have developed more elaborate management
bureaucracies than those described in earlier studies.166
164. Certainly, there is more to be learned about large law firms. This
article is the first report of an ongoing research project that I hope will continue
to provide rich data about the experience of work in large law firms. There is
also much to be learned through comparative studies. For instance, it would be
useful to compare lawyers’ experience of work in large firms with a similar
study of lawyers working in small, non-bureaucratic firms and to examine
whether and how differences in their experience impact their working ethics.
165. See text accompanying notes 81–128.
166. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay who describe less elaborate management
structures. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82. However, both Galanter & Palay
and Nelson predict that the management structures will become more elaborate.
Id. at 807 (describing the “Later” Big Firm); PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra
note 4, at 273–75.
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All large law firms are made up of partners and associates,
and most employ a number of salaried lawyers who are not on the
167
partnership track. Of the ten firms I studied, seven have a twotiered partnership, consisting of equity partners and non-equity
partners.168 Equity partners own the firm. Non-equity partners are
not owners, but typically may vote on all issues that come before
the partnership, with the exception of promotion to equity partner.
The partners, associates and non-partnership track lawyers in these
firms engage in two types of work. First, they provide legal
services for the firm’s clients, and second, to varying degrees, they
contribute to managing the firm itself. In my research, I studied
how large law firms structure both the legal work lawyers perform
for clients, and the work of managing the business of the firm.
A. The Structure of Litigation Work in Large Law Firms
Litigation work in large firms is organized hierarchically
around cases, with the lawyer responsible for the relationship with
the client at the top of the hierarchy. A client will hire a lawyer to
handle a lawsuit. That lawyer may supervise work on the case
himself or he may assign management of the case to a trusted
169
I refer to the lawyer
colleague, a partner, or senior associate.
who manages the case as the “case manager.” The number of
other lawyers assigned to the case will vary depending on the
complexity and stakes involved. A complex, high stakes case may
require four, five, or more lawyers, while a simple case may
require only the case manager and one or two junior lawyers. The
167. Accord MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 64–66 (1991)
(discussing changes in structure of large law firms and the growth of a class of
permanent salaried employees who are not eligible to be promoted to partner).
168. I refer to partners here as either equity partners (meaning owners) or
non-equity partners. The titles used to distinguish partnership status vary from
firm to firm. In addition to “equity” and “non-equity” partners, firms refer to
partners as “capital” and “non-capital” partners, and as “senior” and “junior”
partners.
169. I generally use the terms “he” or “his” when I refer to a generic
lawyer to allow for easier reading. Where I refer to the comments of one of my
subjects, I use the appropriate personal pronouns, except in those instances
where I changed gender information to protect an interviewees’ identity.
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lawyer initially hired by the client, the case manager (if not the
lawyer who brought the work in), and the lawyers working for
them on a case make up the case hierarchy. These case hierarchies
are independent in the sense that partners outside the case
hierarchy do not question or otherwise monitor how a case
manager and his team handle a case.
Within the case hierarchy, the case manager is primarily
responsible for contact with the client, and he supervises the work
of junior lawyers on the case. Typically, the case manager decides
major strategy questions and appears at all significant court
proceedings. The junior lawyers on the case research legal issues
and write memos summarizing their findings; they draft briefs;
they draft discovery requests; and they respond to the other party’s
discovery requests. They may also take and defend depositions
and prepare experts. In this process, some case managers are very
“hands-on” and review and revise every document drafted by the
lawyers who work for them. Other case managers are less
directive, while still demanding that junior lawyers’ work meet
their expectations.
Litigation partners and senior associates who do not bring
clients into the firm, must form alliances with one, or more, of the
firm’s powerful partners with important client relationships who
can provide them with work. The lawyers with important client
relationships who sit at the top of the case hierarchies are
colloquially referred to as “rainmakers,” “queen bees,”
“originators,” and/or “finders.” Often a lawyer who does not have
clients of his own is assigned to manage a case for a client of
another lawyer in the firm. If this case manager has strong client
relationship and case management skills, he may be able to
increase the amount of work coming from the client. For instance,
the client may give him more of its litigation work. Lawyers with
these skills are sometimes referred to as “binders” because they
cement and expand relationships with existing clients. The best
binders form such strong relationships with clients that if they
leave their firms, some clients may move with them.
170
Working for the finders and binders are the “minders.”
Minders may be senior associates learning how to manage cases
170.

There are several variations of this phrase in use. Some lawyers I
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and clients. A minder might also be a non-equity partner with
good legal skills who has not yet demonstrated the ability to form
strong enough relationships with clients to expand the business
coming from the client. Until these lawyers can develop their own
client relationships, they are entirely dependent on finders and
binders at the firm for work, and thus, for their job security. In all
of the firms I studied, minders’ billable hours were tracked and
compared and billable hour expectations were significant.
Some minders never develop into binders or finders. At some
firms, these lawyers may be promoted to non-equity partner and
maintain that status indefinitely. At others, they may be employed
as “counsel” or “staff attorney” or in some other non-partner status
position. At still other firms, lawyers who cannot find or bind
work have a limited tenure and are forced out at the time of the
non-equity partner or the equity partner election, if not before.
Notwithstanding the differences in the prospects for minders
among large firms, in every firm I studied, minders were viewed as
easily replaceable.
While the structure of litigation work described here is not
new, complex management bureaucracies have been superimposed
171
on these case hierarchies relatively recently. The intersection of
the structure of legal work in large firms and the new business
interviewed used the terms finders, binders, and grinders. It is unclear where the
terms finders, binders, minders and grinders originated; however, the terms were
used by a number of the lawyers I interviewed, and they have been incorporated
into socio-legal lexicon describing the status hierarchy in large law firms. See,
e.g., NELSON, supra note 4, at 69–77.
171. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 857 which notes:
Elite lawyers are also experiencing a significant
bureaucratization of their professional workplaces.
As
documented, the size of the nation’s leading law firms has
grown dramatically in recent decades. With very few
exceptions, elite outside counsel . . . now work in
‘partnerships’ of literally hundreds of attorneys, often spread
among offices in several states or even countries . . . . As law
firms grow and diversify, informal social structures and faceto-face contacts no longer suffice to bind these organizations
together, and a new regime of formal hierarchy, recordkeeping, and evaluation has begun to emerge.
Id.
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structures that have been imposed on them is profitability. Those
partners at the top of the case hierarchies, who maintain
relationships with the firms’ most lucrative clients, have power in
the growing bureaucracies that manage large law firms today.172
As one lawyer put it, profitability is the “coin of the realm” in
today’s large law firm bureaucracies. Only the most profitable
finders and binders will have what another of the lawyers I
interviewed referred to as the “moral authority” to be elected to,
and successfully maintain, leading roles in these new management
bureaucracies.
B. The Structure of the Business Bureaucracy of the Large Law
Firm
In Partners with Power, Nelson identified the defining
features of a bureaucratic law firm. First, bureaucratic firms have
“a specialized policy-making group that actively engages in
strategic planning.”173 Second, these firms have “a developed
administrative component consisting of a managing partner and a
mechanism for collecting and analyzing data on the financial
performance of individual lawyers and work groups.”174 Third,
bureaucratic firms have “well-defined work groups (usually taking
the form of departments) with recognized heads who supervise the
group and report to the central policy-making group.”175
All of the firms involved in my study meet Nelson’s criteria.
First, all have a policy-making group made up of the managing
partner(s),176 often the department heads, or a subset of them, and
172. Accord PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 224 (noting that
“[b]ureaucratization in the law firm will always be subject to the prerogatives of
the client responsible elite”).
173. Id. at 91.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Firms have a variety of titles for the lawyer-manager at the apex of
the firm’s management bureaucracy, most frequently “managing partner,” or
“chairman.” Some firms have two managing partners. This often occurs when
the firm is the product of a merger of two firms of relatively equal power. In
firms where the “chairman” is the lawyer at the apex, there may be one or more
“managing partners” working under the chairman. In these circumstances, the
managing partner’s duties may be primarily administrative with decision-
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several other powerful “client-responsible”177 partners in the firm.
These partners form one or more managing committees. The title
178
As Nelson
of these committees varies from firm to firm.
predicted,179 a primary responsibility of the managing partner(s)
and the managing committee(s) that assist him is strategic
planning. Many firms hire consultants to aid managers in this
process. Against the backdrop of the strategic plan, the managing
partner and managing committee(s) make decisions about mergers
and acquisitions, associate hiring, who makes non-equity partner
and equity partner, whether to de-equitize a partner, conflicts of
interest, and the criteria for compensation.
In most of the firms I studied, the partnership retains authority
to vote to approve decisions about who makes partner, but this vote
seems to be a formality in most large firms where many partners
do not know one another, much less all the candidates for nonequity and equity partner. In some of the smaller large firms I
studied, the equity partners maintain some greater degree of
control over compensation decisions by electing a compensation
committee to make compensation decisions or recommendations.
However, senior management usually plays a significant role in
designing the criteria for compensation. Although the equity
partners typically sign off on mergers and acquisitions, senior
management does the strategic planning to determine whether the
making authority residing in the chairman. I use the term “managing partner”
here to refer to the partner at the apex of the management bureaucracy.
177. The term “client responsibility” was coined by Robert Nelson, in
Partners with Power to “refer to the control of a client account by a particular
lawyer.” PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 91.
178. These committees are referred to as the “management committee,”
“executive committee,” “operations committee,” “governing committee,” and
“policy committee,” to name a few.
179. PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 274 states:
The processes of growth and specialization introduce
additional pressures for firms to develop bureaucratic
managerial, administrative and work group structures. At the
managerial level, it will become increasingly apparent that
some group within the organization must plan strategically for
firms to defend their client bases or take advantage of new
opportunities. Hence, the role of leading partners will become
more distinct from that of the rest of the organization.
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firm should consider merger and does the due diligence required to
evaluate a proposed merger. Senior management then goes to the
equity partnership with a recommendation about merger and the
partnership accepts or rejects their proposal.
In some firms, many of the most profitable partners sit on the
committees that make the most significant decisions affecting the
firm. Even if they are not on those committees, however, the
managing partner(s) and the lawyer-managers working with them
must have “buy-in” (meaning support) from those highly profitable
partners to wield the influence necessary to obtain approval from
the partnership for mergers, reformulations of the compensation
180
criteria, and other significant changes.
Second, in keeping with Nelson’s criteria, all of the firms I
studied have established elaborate mechanisms for tracking the
profitability of individual lawyers. Today, partners are evaluated
principally on the profitability of the work they manage rather than
the hours they bill. Firms keep data on the hours worked on a case,
the fees billed to the client,181 the fees actually collected (known in
some firms as the “realization” rate),182 the time required to collect
183
fees, and the overhead chargeable to the partner. Data on each

180. Most of the firms I studied also appointed an “office managing
partner,” a lawyer-manager for each office of the firm. Office managing
partners are typically responsible for administration of their office staff and
facilities. In some firms, the office managing partners also have a role in
strategic planning for their offices, and thus, are expected to have an
understanding of the market for all of the practices within their offices, not just
for their own specialties. Typically, the office managing partner reports to the
managing partner and/or the management committee. Some firms also include
regional office managing partners or representatives on the key management
committee(s).
181. A partner may write off some of the time he and the lawyers working
on a case spent on a task; thus, the fees billed may vary from the time spent.
182. It is not uncommon for clients to try to negotiate fees after time is
billed.
183. Fees paid 120 days after billing are worth less to the firm than fees
paid thirty or sixty days after billing. Consequently, many firms track a
partner’s “turn around time,” meaning the time it takes a partner’s clients to pay
their bills.
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partner are tracked and compared with other partners’ numbers. A
number of firms also track the profitability of practice groups.184
Finally, consistent with Nelson’s criteria, in all of the firms I
studied, lawyers are organized by specialty into well defined work
groups most often referred to as practice groups. In many firms,
these practice groups are coming to be viewed as individual “profit
centers.” All lawyers in the firm are members of one or more
practice groups.185 Some firms subdivide practice groups into
narrower areas of specialization, often referred to as teams.
Lawyers may be members of multiple teams. The practice groups
are usually grouped into larger departments. A firm may have
three departments: Litigation, Business, and Real Estate. The
litigation department will consist of a number of practice groups
organized by specialty and sometimes with reference to the
industry served. A lawyer who specializes in securities litigation
may be a member of the securities litigation team, within the
business litigation practice group, which is a part of the litigation
department. All ten of the firms I studied have offices in more
than one city and the practice group organization described above
transcends geography.
Each firm has developed multi-layered hierarchies of lawyermanagers under the managing partner and the management
committee, who manage the departments and practice groups. The
titles of the lawyers who manage practice groups vary from firm to
186
firm: for example, “leader,” “chair,” or “head.” These practice
group leaders typically report to their department heads, who
report to the managing partner(s) and/or managing committees.187
184. In one firm lawyers reported that although firm management claims
that it does not track the profitability of practice groups, the firm has this data
and considers it when deciding how to divvy up points among equity partners
and whether to elevate a lawyer to non-equity or equity partner status.
185. Although some of the firms studied tout systems that allow associates
to try various practices before specializing, lawyers in those firms reported
associates are under significant pressure to specialize early, certainly within the
first several years of practice.
186. I refer to these lawyers here as practice group leaders.
187. In some firms, when a critical mass of lawyers within a specialty is
located in one office, a manager, who reports to the firm-wide practice group
leader, is appointed for the practice group within that geographic office. For
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Practice group leaders’ management authority often impinges
significantly on the autonomy of the lawyers working within the
group.
For instance, practice group leaders are typically
gatekeepers for the work of the practice group. They must approve
any new work a lawyer wants to bring into the group by criteria
relating to the type of work and the fee arrangements proposed.
Although at the time of my interviews, none of the firms I studied
paid lawyers according to the profitability of their practice group,
the profitability of practice groups is a crucial factor in the
competition for resources among practice groups. For example,
management is unlikely to recommend elevating non-equity
partners to equity partner in practice groups that are not profitable.
Similarly, management may not assign new associates to less
profitable practice groups. Consequently, practice group leaders
watch the profitability of their groups closely and have an
incentive to refuse to allow a lawyer in the group to take on work
they believe will not be sufficiently profitable.
In addition, practice group leaders generally control the
practice group’s resources (human and non human) and decide
how to distribute those resources within the group. The resources
controlled by the practice group leaders vary somewhat from firm
to firm. Generally, they control the budget for equipment and for
conferences. In many firms, they also assign associates to work on
cases or select the lawyer who will allocate work to associates.
Thus, when a partner needs an associate to work on a case, he
generally must ask the practice group leader or work allocator to
assign an associate. If the partner approaches the associate himself
about working on a case, he usually obtains the practice group
leader’s or work allocator’s, formal or informal, acquiescence to
the assignment. In addition, practice group leaders are sometimes
in a position to select the lawyers within the group who will
participate in “client pitches,” and thus, who will have an
188
opportunity to share the credit for obtaining a new client.
instance, the firm may appoint a partner in the securities litigation practice group
to lead the Los Angeles office. The securities litigation practice group manager
for the Los Angeles office then reports to the securities litigation practice group
leader for the firm, who happens to be located in the New York office.
188. “Credit” may be formal or informal. Some firms’ compensation
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Practice group leaders also play a role in the evaluation of
lawyers within the group. In some firms, the practice group leader
coordinates the regular evaluation of associates within the group.
In most firms, associates and non-equity partners need the support
of their practice group leaders to be promoted.
Practice group leaders serve as the group’s official liaison
with firm management. So, for instance, when a practice group
seeks resources (e.g., when the group wants to hire new associates,
paralegals, or staff, or have associates elevated to partner) it is
typically the practice group leader who makes the group’s case to
senior management. In order to garner these resources, a practice
group leader must ensure that their group is profitable and that the
group is highly valued in the firm’s strategic plan. Often, only
those practice groups that are profitable, and/or have a primary
place in the strategic plan, can expect their associates to make
partner and their non-equity partners to become equity partners.
In addition, practice group leaders advocate for lawyers in
their groups when management has to act to avoid conflicts of
interest. While conflict checks are not new, as firms have grown,
conflicts of interest have become more common and often pit
partners or practice groups against one another. Each group wants
to take on the new work to improve its profitability. When a
conflict cannot be waived and the firm has to choose what work to
pursue, decisions about which client to take and which to turn
away are made at the highest levels of firm management. Senior
management typically makes these decisions by reference to
profitability and the strategic plan. Practice group leaders are often
involved in making the case to firm management that the work
their groups want to take on fits within the firm’s strategic plan.
Unlike the managing partner, practice group leaders are not
necessarily the most profitable lawyers in the group. In many
firms, a number of practice group leaders are young equity
partners, who are perceived as rising stars in terms of profitability,
and as having the people skills that will enable them to manage
formulas give lawyers credit for participating in successful pitches. In other
firms, although a lawyer may not receive compensation credit, participating in a
pitch contributes to the perception that a lawyer is a business generator. The
importance of these perceptions is discussed in Part VI.C.
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partners, associates, and any factions within their practice
groups.189 The power actually exercised by practice group leaders
varies greatly from practice group to practice group and from firm
to firm.190 Some practice group leaders are proactive managers and
leaders. In other practice groups, the most powerful equity
partners in the group are not appointed leader because they lack
management skills. Even so, in some cases these partners refuse to
allow anyone else to make decisions of any consequence. In these
groups, the job of practice group leader is largely ministerial, i.e.,
keeping track of data and passing information up and down the
ladder. The role that the practice group leader plays in a given
group can have significant consequences for lawyers working
191
within the group.
Although a powerful practice group leader may limit the
autonomy of many lawyers within the group, profitable partners
may be able to purchase a degree of autonomy that others in the
group cannot. For instance, while a firm may officially require all
partners to prepare a business plan, a practice group leader may
ignore the requirement for a very profitable partner, or a highly
profitable partner may be able to charge a client a lower hourly rate
than other partners would be permitted to charge for a new matter.
Lawyers at the highest levels of management identify one of the
central tensions in large firms today as whether management is
able to control decisions in the areas outlined above, i.e., whether
management can decline to follow the wishes of a significant
partner and still maintain power.
The power of the managers of today’s large law firm
bureaucracies described above has created a whole new fealty
ladder that lawyers within the firm must learn to climb. In addition
to negotiating the hierarchies inherent in the structure of the legal
189. In one firm I studied, the majority of the practice group leaders were
what were known as “service partners,” binders who work for the firm’s
powerful finders.
190. A number of firms I studied were discussing giving greater authority
to practice group leaders at the time of my interviews. For instance, one firm
was considering giving practice group leaders authority to decide some portion
of the lawyers’ compensation. See also Terry Carter, New Roles for Group
Leaders, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 32.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 44–47.

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

674

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 4

work of the firm, lawyers in large firms now must also negotiate
multiple layers of relatively complex management bureaucracies.192
C. Conflicts and Tensions, Incentives and Motivations
The pressure of the profitability imperative on these large-firm
bureaucracies creates the central conflicts, tensions, incentives, and
motivations affecting large-firm lawyers. Changes in the market
for corporate legal services have been widely discussed in the legal
scholarship.193 As large corporations are hiring in-house counsel,
more of a corporation’s routine legal work is done in-house.194
192. These new management bureaucracies are certainly more complex
than those described by Smigel and even those described by Nelson in 1988.
See supra notes 132–144, 102–106 and accompanying text. Galanter and Palay,
however, predicted this change. See supra note 149. To date, no commentators
have interviewed large-firm lawyers regarding the impact of these more
elaborate management bureaucracies and the organizational logic they bring
with them.
193. Several authors have discussed the growth in the number of in-house
lawyers as being responsible for increasing competition among large law firms
for clients. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 4, at 8 noting that:
The transformation in the legal needs of the corporation
transformed the market for large-firm services.
The
emergence of new functions for the corporate law firm was
also associated with the decline of its traditional practice base.
Routine corporate matters were taken over by inside counsel .
. . the firm’s relationships with corporate clients underwent a
discernable change. Continuous broad-ranging relationships
between firms and corporate clients were increasingly
displaced by a series of ad hoc, case-by-case, field-by-field
relationships between a corporation and many law firms.
Suchman, supra note 10, at 856–57 (explaining that “many corporate clients
have responded to rising legal costs by augmenting their in-house counsel’s
offices, making these companies into unprecedentedly informed consumers of
professional services”).
194. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 167, at 46–50. The authors describe
the growth in size of in-house counsel departments and as the size of these
departments has grown so has the amount of work being brought in house and
state that:
A series of surveys by Altman & Weil found that, from 1976
to 1982, the percentage of firms reporting in-house counsel do
three-quarters of the corporations legal work increased from
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Large corporations view the outside legal services they purchase as
a commodity.195 They typically enter the legal marketplace looking
for services on a project by project, case by case basis196 or they
may hire one firm to do all of a particular type of legal work.197
For example, a corporation might hire one, or a few firms, to
handle its entire products liability defense. Corporations shop for
firms to do this work, and a number of firms may compete for the
business. Many firms have opened offices in multiple cities in an
attempt to make themselves attractive to large corporations with a
need for legal services in many regions of the country.198 As a
result, firms no longer “own” the work they do because there is
always a competitor waiting in the wings trying to steal the client
away.
Further, firms’ relationships with their clients are often built
on personal relationships with in-house lawyers who face
uncertainty themselves. A former managing partner of a large
national firm explained:

56.0 percent to 66.5 percent . . . . While law departments
formerly confined themselves to processing routine corporate
legal matters and left major transactions and litigation work to
outside counsel, they are now undertaking more work that
once would have gone to outside lawyers. Some in-house
counsel now conduct some or all of their own litigation . . . .
The relation of corporate law departments to outside counsel
has shifted from comprehensive and enduring retainer
relationships toward less exclusive and more task-specific ad
hoc arrangements . . . . In their relationship with outside law
firms, today’s enlarged corporate legal departments impose
budgetary restraints, exert more control over cases, demand
periodic reports, and engage in comparison shopping among
firms.
195. Id. at 46–50.
196. Id.
197. The phenomenon of firms competing for business has been
documented by other scholars, and in the popular legal press. See, e.g.,
Suchman, supra note 10, at 856–57 (describing increase in competitive pressure
among firms). These competitions are sometimes fought out in what are called
“beauty contests” or “client pitches.”
198. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 167, at 46–50.
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It is very hard to “own” business today. In-house
counsel who is your friend loses his job. Now you
need to scramble for work. There were many emails within the firm where a lawyer was asking if
anyone knew of job for Joe X [who just lost his inhouse position]. If you can find Joe an in-house
position, you can secure work [for yourself and the
firm]—if not, you’re out of luck.
Even if a partner’s relationship with a client is secure, he faces
contingencies within his firm. For instance, firm management may
decide to increase the firm’s billing rates beyond what a partner’s
clients are willing to pay. This partner must either find new clients
or resign and take his existing clients to a firm that charges lower
rates.
As corporate clients have become less loyal to the firms they
hire, lawyers have become less loyal to the firms that employ
199
them. When large firms had long-term, stable relationships with
their clients, a retiring senior partner could “hand down” or
“bequeath” a client to a more junior partner.200 The ability to pass a
client down the generations encouraged strong loyalties among
lawyers in a firm. Because most large firms do not own work
today, junior lawyers cannot count on inheriting work from their
elders; they must think differently about their careers. As a former
managing partner explained, “Today, a lawyer needs to build
skills. Yesterday, a lawyer needed to build a practice. A lawyer
today is more of a hired gun, less the owner of a small business.”
While these changes were occurring, the popular legal press
was born,201 and the American Lawyer began reporting firms’
199. Id. at 54–55 (documenting the increase in lateral movement of
lawyers and groups of lawyers from one firm to another beginning in the
1970’s).
200. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? 234–35 (The Free Press of Glencoe 1969) (identifying the
lawyers who “inherit” the firms largest clients as the lawyers who controlled the
Wall Street firms he studied).
201. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 68–76 (documenting the
chronological development of the legal press). The authors’ reference Erwin
Smigel’s work in The Wall Street Lawyer, reporting that in the 1950’s firms kept
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“profits per partner.”202 As a result, lawyers in large firms can, and
do, compare what they earn to what they think lawyers in
comparable firms are earning and may change firms if they think
they can make more money or have access to more resources.203
To attract profitable laterals to their firms, management strives
to keep the firm’s profits per partner number high. To do this,
managers must keep the number of equity partners small. This
creates another of the primary tensions in large firms. Most equity
partners in large firms rely on non-equity partners or senior
associates to manage their cases for them. To keep those lawyers
motivated, equity partners need to be able to hold out a realistic
possibility that these lawyers will be elected equity partners.
However, as the pressure grows to keep the equity partnership
small, the odds of making equity partner in the large law firms I
studied, and in large firms across the country, have become far
204
worse.
information about partnership agreements, finances, client lists and salaries
confidential. Id. The authors credit the Supreme Court decision in Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), with giving birth to the legal press because
lawyers could talk to reporters about their practices without being accused of
advertising. Id. Reporting about lawyers and the practice of law increased in
both The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. For example, by the late
1970s, several national law publications, including The American Lawyer and
The National Law Journal, began reporting on the internal workings of the
profession including firm’s hiring policies, marketing strategies, clients, fee
structures and compensation. Id.
202. The American Lawyer began publishing “profits per partner” among
the nation’s top law firms in 1984. A Guide To Our Methodology, AM. LAW.,
Aug. 2003, at 85. All of the lawyers I spoke to about these statistics were highly
skeptical about their accuracy. The American Lawyer claims it gathers the data
it uses to determine profits per partner from both official and unofficial sources.
Id. The “official” sources are members of large-firm management committees
who are willing to provide information. Id. According to The American
Lawyer, for the firms that refuse to provide information, the reporters obtain
information from “unofficial” sources—members of these firms who provided
the information anonymously. Id.
203. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 856–57.
204. See NELSON, supra note 4, at 3 (describing the changes in large-firm
practice and how firms “have raised the threshold for full partnership by
lengthening the number of years required before admission to partnership,
inserting intermediate levels of partnership, and conferring partnership status on
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The lowered odds of making equity partner create a
competition among practice groups, and sometimes between nonequity partners within practice groups, for a limited number of
equity partnership seats. Profitability and management’s strategic
plan are key determinants in this competition. For instance, the
strategic plan may call for the firm to position itself as specializing
in providing legal services for the financial services industry.
Management will devote resources, marketing expenditures, new
hires, and equity partnership seats to those practice groups that
service that industry. Because the products liability practice group
does not serve the financial services industry, lawyers in that group
are unlikely to be promoted to equity partner.
In addition, even the most successful partners in large firms
face contingencies and uncertainty they did not face thirty years
ago. In all of the firms I studied, there was talk of de-equitizing
partners who had not been profitable for a number of years in order
205
An equity
to keep the firm’s profits per partner number up.
only a small percentage of any entering cohort”); Marie Beaudette, Associates
Leave Firms in Droves, Becoming Partner Is No Longer a Priority—And If It Is,
It Is a Difficult Goal, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 2003, at C4 (reporting the results of a
NALP Foundation study showing large numbers of associates leaving firms
before making partner). One of the reasons for the exodus is the remote chances
of becoming partner. Id. “In large part, associates believe making partner is
out of their grasp, either because the standards are unfairly applied or because
firms don’t want to slice up their profits further, the study found.” Id. See also,
Nathan Koppel, The Cahill Way, AM. LAW., July 2003 at 92 (describing the
promotion practices of the second most profitable firm in The American Law
100’s most profitable firm ranking, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel. “Every year
Cahill generally hires 30–40 new associates, and it makes, on average, fewer
than two new partners. In the last 14 years . . . . the firm has made 26 new
partners.”); Martha Neil, Brave, New World of Partnership, A.B.A. J., Jan.
2004, at 30–33 (reporting that firms now use a two-tier partnership track
extending the time it takes to make equity partner and that among associates that
can put in the hours necessary to be considered for partnership status, “[o]nly a
small fraction of associates are eventually offered partnership.” The article also
quotes an attorney in a large Manhattan firm describing the path to partnership
as “[i]t’s not enough to be just a really good lawyer in competing for partnership
. . . [y]ou have to be a really good lawyer, in the right practice area, in the right
time in the economy. There are so many variables that are just beyond anyone’s
control.”).
205. A lawyer who was a high level manager in his firm noted that most
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partner explained, “All firms have dead wood,206 some are more
successful at cleaning [it] out than others . . . . The firm has to have
a carrot and a stick to keep people in line.” An equity partner in
another firm agreed, “[The firm needs to] cut out the dogs. Get rid
of the partner whose practice has died. Every two to three years
[the firm needs to] look closely and make the hard decisions—look
at production versus salary. Nip the thing in the bud and deequitize the couch potatoes.” Many of the lawyers I interviewed
reported that their firms had already de-equitized partners, and
others suggested that de-equitizing was imminent.
VI. THE WORLD OF LARGE-FIRM LITIGATORS
Large-firm lawyers develop stated and unstated rules—what
sociologists would call “rules-in-use”—to negotiate the
uncertainties, conflicts, and tensions created by the bureaucracies
in which they work. These rules-in-use guide their decisions about
whom to work for, how to behave, how to deal with clients and
adversaries, and what legal and professional judgments to make.
Among these rules-in-use is what I refer to as a choice of norm
rule. The rules-in-use at work in large law firms, including the
choice of norm rule, shape the way large-firm lawyers think, what
sociologists call their “habits of mind.”207 The rules-in-use and
habits of mind at work in large firms are evident in lawyers’ stories
about their experiences in their firms.
When asked who succeeds and advances in large law firm
bureaucracies and why,208 lawyers talked about understanding what
is expected of them and meeting those expectations. For lawyers

firms’ partnership agreements do not provide for “de-equitizing,” but he had
never heard of anyone challenging the practice.
206. Equity partners who are not profitable are referred to as “dead wood”
in many firms.
207. See, e.g., JACKALL, supra note 6 (describing the habits of mind of
corporate managers).
208. I did not begin my study asking large-firm lawyers which associates
succeeded in their firms and why, but I quickly discovered that this was what
large-firm lawyers were interested in talking about. I came to understand that a
discussion of who succeeds and why provided a window into the rules-in-use
and habits of mind of large-firm lawyers.
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who do not generate their own business, this means understanding
what the lawyers above them in the case hierarchy expect.209 These
lawyers must know how the lawyers who supervise them expect
work to be done and expect them to behave in any given situation.
With the exception of those lawyers who are so profitable as to be
able to purchase substantial autonomy, large-firm lawyers must
also
understand
their
lawyer-managers’
expectations.
Understanding what those above you want is crucial for promotion
to non-equity and to equity partner. Understanding what firm
management and peers expect is also a key ingredient for success
in the battle for resources among equity partners and practice
groups.
When they speak about expectations, large-firm lawyers are
210
Some of the norms lawyers must
talking about “norms.”
understand and follow are shared by lawyers across the firm;
others are not. When individual partners or groups of lawyers
within the firm do not espouse or follow the same norms, largefirm lawyers employ a choice of norm rule. Across all of the large
firms I studied, the choice of norm rule lawyers applied was the
same: understand and follow the expectations/norms that the
lawyer or lawyers who matter at the moment would want you to
follow in the situation. When I asked large-firm lawyers to
describe what is expected of them and how they meet those
expectations, first and foremost, they spoke about “being
available” to the lawyers with and for whom they work.

209. It is relatively rare for associates and junior partners in large firms to
generate their own business because the firm is looking for work among Fortune
500 companies and other wealthy clients who can pay them fees which ranged
from $190 to $725 per hour at the time of my research. See Renee Deger,
Silicon Valley Sees Rates on the Rise, NAT’L. L.J., Dec. 15, 2003, at col. 1
(reporting on recent hourly rate increases). However, an associate or junior
partner who does generate business will occupy the role of the finder.
210. See Sunstein, supra note 154, at 914 (defining “norms” as “social
attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and
what ought not to be done”).
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A. The Importance of “Being Available”
In negotiating the case hierarchy, lawyers who work for other
lawyers must understand that their supervisors are their primary
“clients.” Supervising lawyers expect “service” from associates in
the same way clients expect service from their lawyers. In fact,
one lawyer referred to the lawyers she works for in her firm as
“internal clients.” All of the lawyers I interviewed spoke about the
necessity of being available to other lawyers and to their clients.
For lawyers who do not generate their own business, “being
available” means not turning down assignments. As a result,
lawyers in the country’s largest firms work long hours when their
groups have abundant work. When asked how associates succeed,
an equity partner said, “You have to be available. You can’t say
no.” A successful fifth year associate noted:
I have never turned work down. Actually, I turned
down work once after a huge arbitration where I
billed 1,000 hours in three months. I needed a
vacation or I was going to have a nervous
breakdown. I told the partner I would do the work
when I got back.
A senior associate explains that expectations about being
available often remain unstated:
Some associates don’t understand or don’t care
211
what is expected. I leave my Blackberry on
vibrate at night. One time I was working with [a
partner in another department] on a matter. At two
a.m., I’m asleep in bed and my Blackberry goes off.
It was this partner e-mailing me from the office. I
got up and e-mailed a response. This went on for
several nights. James [the equity partner who is this
associate’s mentor] never asks explicitly for this,
but I know he wants it too. He doesn’t say he

211. “Blackberry” is the brand name of a hand held wireless device that
allows the user to send and receive e-mail from outside the office.

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

682

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 4

expects it, but he wants me to return his e-mails
over the weekend. He tells me that he likes that I
have never turned him down when he asks for
something.
Even an astute summer associate quickly becomes aware that
expectations about availability are often unstated, and if stated, that
the stated expectations may, in fact, conflict with actual
expectations.
The rhetoric coming from the firm to summer
associates was that quality of life was very
important. We were told that if associates worked
too many hours, the firm would lock the door to
their offices and tell them that they could not come
212
in. But when you looked at who was successful it
was the people who were working long hours.
....
No partner at [the firm] would ever say “you need
to work this weekend,” but the people who were
succeeding were working weekends. Whenever
partners mentioned associates favorably, they
mentioned those who were working incredibly long
hours. The people who were making it, the
associates a partner would mention at a meeting—
“Jeff did a great job on this”—were the highest
billers among the associates. The “go to” associates
never said no to an assignment. These were the
people who were first in, in the morning, and last
out at night.
Superiors also expect the lawyers who work for them to be
responsive to clients’ needs “24/7.” Many of the lawyers I
212. This summer associate noted, “Young lawyers coming into the firm
were typically of two types. First, there were those dead set on making partner
from the outset. Second, there were those who were looking for interesting
work but also wanted a private life. The summer associate recruiting
committee’s message was geared to the second group of people.”
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interviewed routinely gave their clients their home and cell phone
numbers and carried a wireless hand held device for sending and
213
receiving e-mails. It is not only associates who work long hours
213. Not all associates working in large firms are willing to meet the
expectation that they always be available. During their tenure as associates at
large firms, young lawyers are identified as what one lawyer characterized as
“contenders” and “non-contenders.” Some of the non-contenders are selfselected while others are not. As David Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati have
observed, during the first several years of an associate’s tenure at a firm, large
firms identify those associates who lack the required dedication or skills to
advance and fire them or assign them low prestige, repetitive work. See Wilkins
& Gulati, supra note 82. Among those associates who survive the weeding out
process, many will decide they do not want to vie for partnership. Many are not
willing to sacrifice their personal lives to work the hours required to put them in
contention for partnership.
These self-selected and unannounced noncontenders may stay for a number of years to earn large salaries, but will leave
the firm before they are considered for partnership. As a fifth-year associate
notes, they “do not announce their intention to leave because it would be
political suicide to do so.”
The contenders I spoke with have similar views of the non-contenders. A
contender says, “One of the things that separate the contenders from the noncontenders is their work ethic. Many of the non-contenders are not trying.” She
observes that she and her fellow contenders are “in-bred workaholics.
[Contenders] would be working this hard no matter what they were doing for a
living.” Another contender agrees:
When I was in college and law school, I thought everyone
wanted to make it to the top, to be successful. I now realize
there are people who just want to get to the middle; they are
content to fly under the radar screen. They do mid-level work
and try not to attract attention. They don’t want to make the
extra effort. You can tell who these people are early on. You
look to see who will take on a new project; who will take on
the really messy project; who will write the article for the bar
journal. One associate says yes, the other says she’s too busy.
Both have the same amount of work on their plate. You can
tell who really wants it and who is just comfortable.
While they see themselves embodying a work ethic the non-contenders do not
share, the contenders are conscious of the choices they are making. Inevitably,
they come to question their choice to stay in light of the low odds of making
partner at many firms. A fifth year contender at a large firm observes:
I’ve missed a lot by choosing this large-firm life. All my
college friends are married and have children. All my friends
from law school [all of whom work at large firms] are single
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in large law firms. One partner explained, “[T]he hours don’t get
any better for partners; partners have even more pressure than
associates do.”
The hours do not get better for partners because other lawyers
also expect partners to be available to them. Many litigators,
including some partners, spend a portion of their time managing
litigation for clients of partners in other practice areas. For
example, a corporate partner may ask a litigation partner to handle
a lawsuit for a corporate client. Because these litigators do not
have the primary relationship with the client, and the corporate
partner is providing the litigator with work, the litigator needs to
meet the expectations of the corporate partner, as well as the client,
to maintain this “feeder” relationship. An equity partner related a
conversation she had with one of her partners who was “fed up”
with meeting his partners’ expectations:
We walked out of the building one night, he told me
he was going to stop working for this [group of
lawyers in the firm] and go back to more
generalized work in his area. He said he was [fiftyfive] and couldn’t keep doing what he was doing.
He said the partners [in the practice group he
serviced] were jerks to him, often called him on
Friday night at five and said “oh sorry, I forgot we
need an opinion by Monday morning.” He had no
autonomy and no home life. He realized that
moving to more generalized work would mean a
demotion in status and probably pay, [but] he
wanted to make the move. He [said] he could not
do this for another ten years.
This partner was an equity partner with very specialized expertise,
and he did almost all of his work for partners in other practice
areas.

and have no kids. Working till 9:00 p.m. every night is no
fun. When I occasionally leave at 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., I am
amazed at the numbers of people on the street. I think, “Do
you leave this early every day?”
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In contrast, a profitable equity partner who generates
substantial business has far greater latitude to pick and choose
when and to whom within the firm he sacrifices his time. An
equity partner, Will, described his response to Jeff, an equity
partner whose book of business had evaporated in the last couple
of years:
If he called me two years ago and said I need you in
LA next week, I would have been in LA the
following week. Today if he calls and asks me to
go to LA next week, I look at my calendar. If I am
not interested in going for my own reasons and I see
my daughter has a soccer tournament next week, I
will tell him “I am really sorry but my daughter has
a tournament.” Two years ago, I would have
missed my daughter’s tournament.
Because Jeff was no longer particularly relevant to Will, the choice
of norm rule requiring Will to meet the expectations of those who
“matter” did not require Will to go out of his way to meet Jeff’s
expectations.
Equity partners must also be available to their partners to
garner firm resources when they need or want them. One equity
partner describes this as building a “goodwill bank” with his
partners. He drew on this goodwill bank when he wanted one of
the lawyers who worked for him selected for equity partner, or if
his practice declined and he needed his partners to give him time to
rebuild it before they significantly reduced his compensation or deequitized him. Asked how he builds goodwill, this partner said “it
is really about not saying no.”
Increasingly, as the firm’s bureaucracy grows, lawyers in
large firms must also be available to the lawyer-managers to do the
“business” work of the firm. Lawyers must be willing to do
increasing amounts of non-billable work ranging from work on
firm committees, or participating in client pitches, to helping
prepare firm marketing materials. Even partners are expected to
devote time to the non-billable work of the firm, and unless they
are so profitable that they have significant autonomy, they must
meet those expectations. Not all lawyers recognize the import of
these expectations. As a team leader explained:
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As a manager my “bullshit meter” is always way
up. The people I manage are litigators; they are
advocates. But some are all talk. People can smell
these folks a mile away. These are the people who
say, “Pick me, pick me” and never follow through.
These are people who are assigned to do a client
pitch; they volunteer to take on an action item in
preparation for the pitch and never do it. These
people die and they don’t understand why, they
think they are stars, well liked. I say, “Don’t give
me happy talk, do something.”
Some partners are sufficiently profitable to purchase a degree
of autonomy within the firm, and as a result, may not have to meet
all of management’s expectations. For example, two profitable
partners reported that they had not prepared the individual partner
business plans their respective firms’ management required of all
partners. Neither partner was chastised for not preparing a
214
While their practice group leaders apparently
business plan.
elected not to push this issue with these partners, both lawyers
reported that less profitable partners in their groups were not excused from this obligation.
The expectations about what kinds of work a lawyer needs to
be available to perform differ from firm to firm, from practice
group to practice group, and often from partner to partner.
Because expectations about what kind of work a lawyer should
spend his time on vary, choice of norm rules come into play. An
equity partner noted, “A junior lawyer may think the partner wants
him to bill 2,500 hours a year, [but] knowing what is expected also
means understanding that in reality that partner would like to see
that lawyer bill 2,200 hours and spend 300 hours chairing an ABA
committee.” A lawyer must recognize and understand these
varying expectations and meet them.
Lawyers in large firms trade being available for a steady
stream of work for support in their quest for advancement and for
support in the inevitable competition for firm resources. Partners
214. One of these partners reported that he had been the most profitable
lawyer in his firm the previous year.
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who have relationships with powerful clients see a lawyer’s
willingness to be available as a sign of loyalty, and they reward
that loyalty with more work. In addition, says one equity partner,
“[p]artners . . . try to take care of people who have been loyal to
them by helping them get elevated to partner. They look for
people who have been loyal to them and . . . who won’t compete
with them.”
In contrast, a lawyer who is not seen as sufficiently available
may lose a source of work and damage his chances of
advancement. An equity partner described the negative reaction of
a partner she was working for when he thought she was misleading
215
him about being available:
If you are not responsive to [the partners you
service] you are at risk. If you are not there,
partners and clients find someone else, and you are
out. [I’ll give you an example.] I disabled the
function on my Blackberry that says “This message
is courtesy of Comcast” at the bottom of every email you send [indicating that the e-mail was sent
from a “Blackberry,” thus not from the lawyer in
her office.] One of the partners I was working for
e-mailed me while I was at a meeting outside the
office. I got the message on my Blackberry and
responded. He sent back an e-mail asking “Are you
in the office?” I told him no. When I got back to
the office and saw this partner, he implied that I was
being deceptive by turning off the Comcast
message.
She explained that she disabled the Comcast message because
“clients want to think you are always available to them. If they
know you are replying from out of the office, but you are not out
[working] on something for them, they don’t like it.” The partner
seemed reassured, but this lawyer saw her partner’s reaction as

215. This equity partner spends a portion of her time doing specialized
litigation for clients of lawyers in other practice groups in her firm.
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evidence that she must create the perception that she is always
available if she does not want her partner to “find someone else.”
Having a strong relationship with the finders and binders a
lawyer works for is also essential to surviving the occasional,
inevitable mistake. All of the lawyers I spoke with agreed that
every lawyer makes mistakes. Substantive mistakes range from
missing a deadline, to producing documents that could have been
withheld, to forgetting to shepardize cases. Whether a mistake is
fatal to a lawyer’s career depends, in part, on the strength of his
relationship with the lawyer supervising him.
When a junior lawyer makes a mistake, the lawyers I
interviewed agreed that the supervising partner rarely blames the
mistake on the junior lawyer when communicating with the client.
More often, the partner takes responsibility for the mistake. For
example, one lawyer says:
I’ve never heard of a partner hanging an associate
out to dry. Mistakes stay within the group working
on the case. You don’t tell other partners about
them, you don’t tell the client if you don’t have to,
that a mistake has been made. If you can, you
smooth it over. The client doesn’t want to know
that the associate has enough reign to make these
kinds of mistakes.
And when an associate has a strong relationship with the
supervising partner, mistakes may matter less. As a fifth year
associate notes:
I’ve made two mistakes. First, I filed an affidavit
without understanding what was involved in the
case. I made a mistake in another case. I [sent]
opposing counsel privileged documents in the
discovery process . . . I disclosed a document to
opposing counsel that had attorney handwriting on
it so it could have been claimed as privileged.
These are the kind of mistakes that make you
physically ill.
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This associate felt certain these mistakes would not be used against
her because she had very strong relationships with the supervising
216
partners involved.
Associates must also show their loyalty by not revealing
partners’ mistakes. An equity partner explains, “I don’t want
someone who is backstabbing me. I had an associate who worked
for me . . . who would then go work for another partner and tell
him what I screwed up. Why do I need that?” If a junior lawyer
has been sufficiently loyal to partners in the firm to develop strong
relationships with them, those partners may also be willing to use
their influence to advocate for his promotion to partner.
B. The Criteria for Partnership—the Invisible and Moving Bar
When large-firm lawyers speak about their work, the quest for
partnership—who makes it and who does not and why—is a
central concern. Associates are preoccupied with their own
chances for making partner and measure their chances against their
peers’ chances. Partners are concerned about whether their
protégés will make partner. The habits of mind lawyers develop in
response to the partnership tournament—the intense focus on
managing perceptions and the premium on the ability to adapt—
play an important role in shaping their ethical consciousness.
States one attorney, “[t]o make partner you must have a
champion for your file. If your mentor does not say anything
negative, but does not give you momentum, you are dead.” For an
equity partner to be willing to champion a lawyer’s file, that
lawyer must have demonstrated his loyalty to the partner by being
available and by “knowing what is wanted and giving it.” A
partner who decides to champion his loyalist’s file will expend
goodwill in the effort. For example, one equity partner I
interviewed reported that he had just received a call from David,
another equity partner, asking him to support the election of Susan
to equity partner. The partner I spoke with believed David was

216. See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1613–15 (arguing that if
firms were structured as classic rank order tournaments one would expect
competition between associates or sabotage, but noting that large firms “do not
appear to be characterized by high levels of employee sabotage”).
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calling every equity partner in a firm of more than 700 lawyers,
asking them to support Susan. As large firms grow larger, the
influence of each equity partner is diluted, meaning there are fewer
partners who are profitable enough to demand that their loyalists
be made equity partner.
Most large firms have established committees to evaluate
candidates for promotion to non-equity and equity partner. These
committees make recommendations to firm management and/or
directly to the partnership. Members of these committees come
from different practice areas and often from different regions of the
country. As a result, the candidate may know few or none of the
members of the committee who will evaluate him for partnership.
The criteria these committees use to evaluate candidates are often
vague or largely unstated and are constantly changing. As a
lawyer who has been working at a firm for fifteen years and has
not made partner says, “The thinking at [the firm] has become that
just being a good lawyer and doing a good job for seven to nine
years is not enough. What is enough is a matter of speculation.”
Even a recently elected equity partner claims, “Having just been
217
elevated to equity partner, I have no idea what the criteria are.”
All of the lawyers I spoke with agreed that being a good
lawyer is not enough to make equity partner in today’s large firms,
and in a number of firms, it is also not enough to make non-equity
partner.218 Large firms view good lawyers as expendable. As one
217. This is consistent with Wilkins and Gulati’s findings. Wilkins &
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1667–69. Wilkins and Gulati posit that firms use
secrecy to keep senior associates motivated and working hard, stating:
Recall that these lawyers are primarily motivated to work hard
with little supervision by the desire to make partner. Having
no more than a minimal amount of information about how
they rank against their competitors and what weights are going
to be given to different aspects of their performance[], these
lawyers have strong incentives to work hard at everything
possible. From the firm’s perspective . . . the black box
approach—not the open door policy suggested by standard
tournament theory—maximizes the incentive effects of the
tournament for these lawyers.
Id.
218. Accord PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 28 (contrasting this
phenomenon with an era when good lawyers could expect to make equity
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equity partner put it, “You can’t swing a dead cat in New York
without hitting a good lawyer.” By the time a lawyer is being
considered for partner, “being a good lawyer is off the table,”
meaning the “good lawyer” criterion has been met, and other
criteria will be the deciding factors. Now that fewer and fewer
partners have the power to demand that their candidates be
promoted to equity partner, the enthusiastic support of one or
more equity partners is frequently not enough. When pressed to
identify the other criteria that determine who makes partner,
lawyers repeatedly spoke about the necessity of managing
appearances and perceptions.
Perceptions have become increasingly important in large firms
because, as large firms grow, lawyers within these firms have less
direct, personal knowledge about other lawyers in their firms.
Partners often know relatively little about many of their partners
and they do not know many of the associates and laterals coming
into their firms. As Wilkins and Gulati note, even when an
associate works for a partner, the partner often has little time to
219
closely monitor the associate’s work. Wilkins and Gulati further
state: “[i]n situations in which quality judgments depend on a
complex evaluation of an employee’s technical competence,
thoroughness, and judgment (in addition to results), a firm would
have to retrace a good deal of the employee’s actual decisionmaking process before it could reach an accurate assessment about
performance.”220
Wilkins and Gulati argue that because close monitoring of
associates’ work is prohibitively expensive, large firms have little
information on which to base determinations about which
associates will receive coveted training assignments.221 As a
consequence, they argue firms tend to rely on readily observable
signals (for instance law school status, class rank, prestigious

partner in a large law firm).
219. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms, An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 518
(1996).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 568–69.
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clerkships, etc.) to make these decisions.222 When decisions are
being made without more accurate information, Wilkins and Gulati
argue that stereotypes and bias are more likely to impact decisionmaking.223 My research indicates that the lack of information in
large law firms leads to another important phenomenon: Largefirm lawyers rely on perceptions to make judgments about one
another. As a consequence, large-firm lawyers must understand
how they need to be perceived in order to compete successfully for
promotion.
1. Managing Perceptions
From their first days at the firm, associates learn to “look up
224
A fifth year associate assigned to the
and look around.”
committee in charge of summer associates explained:
I give the summer associates advice when they
come in. I tell them “figure out who the superstars
are, look at how they behave and copy them.” I
give them names of people who are superstars. I
say, “Dress like them, watch their behavior at firm
functions and with clients, copy them.”
Moreover, lawyers must understand that they may need to
vary their public faces225 depending on the situation. For example,
a former summer associate described Jim, a “superstar” among
associates at his firm:
It became clear that the good associates developed a
partner face, when they talked to the partners they

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 75–100. “Looking up and looking around”
is a phrase coined by Jackall to refer to the habit of mind of managers in large
corporate bureaucracies who look up to their superiors and look around their
social networks to determine what decisions to make. Id.
225. I use the term “public face” to mean the “conscious projection of a
constructed persona” as Robert Jackall defined it in commenting on an earlier
draft of this paper. See supra note 6.
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were different than when they talked to other
people. [For instance, when Jim] sat down and
talked to [associates] it was like sitting in a high
school locker room. However, when he talked to a
partner he was a completely different person and the
switch was totally natural; he didn’t seem to have to
think about it, he just moved into it naturally. The
associates loved this guy, he was succeeding but he
was one of them. The partners also loved this guy,
it seemed like he was always at the firm, always
available . . . . I was in [Jim’s] office at one point
when a partner called him asking him to work on
another project and he said to [the partner] “I’m
really busy, can you tell me more about this project”
and he would thereby create the impression that he
was busy but that he would take on this project to
work with this partner because he really liked
working with him. I don’t think that [Jim] was all
that busy when he said this, however, this was
totally natural to him, it wasn’t as if he was
scheming.
A fifth year associate contrasts the public face her firm
expects her to adopt with adversaries, the public face clients expect
her to adopt, and the perceptions she needs to create when dealing
with her superiors in the firm. She explains:
To make partner in litigation you need to be seen as
really aggressive. Your partners need to know that
you are not going to be pushed around or bullied out
there . . . . The client wants to know that you won’t
be pushed around; that you will do what you need
to, to defend them. You have to create the
impression that you are looking out for the client in
every way. Internally, [inside the firm] you need to
be a yes person.
Not only must these lawyers be able to create contradictory
perceptions—being aggressive and a “yes person”—at times they
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must also project a public face that belies their reality.
example, an associate tells the following story:
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For

The partner said you run this case, Claire; “I will be
hands off” but then he would call and say “how can
you have done X?” He knew nothing about the case
but was calling the shots from the sidelines, from
the bleachers really. He was going to try the case,
but he knew nothing about it. I went to [my
mentor] and asked him what I could do to get this
partner involved. He gave me some useful advice.
But basically I had to run with the ball and give the
impression that I could do that, that I could run the
case. The other partners in the department knew he
wasn’t giving me any help. If I had let on that I was
panicking, it would have ruined my reputation with
all of the other partners.
Perceptions are created early and can be hard to change. A
lawyer who has been passed over for partner several times notes:
One thing has become apparent. It is difficult to
come up for partner after seven to ten years at a
firm.
If you’ve been there straight through,
whatever mistakes you’ve made [and your early
insecurities] are rattling around back there. If you
come in [to the firm] as a fifth year, you can start
over; create a perception of yourself as a superstar.
In addition to appearing confident, to be promoted, a lawyer in
a large-firm must be perceived as “somebody who looks like
they’d be able to develop clients.” At the seven-to-nine year
mark—when firms are deciding whether to promote associates to
non-equity partner—most lawyers will not have generated
significant business from the Fortune 500 companies that large law
firms service today. Consequently, firms make decisions about
promotion to non-equity partner based on perceptions about who
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will be able to generate that kind of business in the future.226 In
some firms, the decision about promotion to equity partner is still
largely based on perceptions about the ability to generate or bind
substantial business. In other firms, in order to be promoted to
equity partner, lawyers must have a track record of either
substantial business generation or significant expansion of business
and be perceived as able to generate or bind more business.227
Perhaps most importantly, to be promoted, a lawyer must be
perceived as understanding the need to create the right perceptions.
Lawyers who do not understand what perceptions they need to
create, or even recognize that they need to worry about how they
are perceived, are not acting in accordance with their firm’s
organizational logic—the socially constructed rules, premiums,
and sanctions that lawyers create to guide their behavior.
A litigation department head gives examples of lawyers who,
in his view, are able to create the necessary perceptions to be
elected equity partner and those who are not. He describes a
226. This is consistent with Wilkins and Gulati’s findings. See Wilkins &
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1657–60 (observing “that [f]irms make partnership
decisions not as a reward for past associate performance, but as a prediction of
which partner candidates will contribute the most in the future.” Promotion
decisions are based on potential future performance because “[p]artners play a
fundamentally different role in law firms than associates, even senior associates.
[P]artners have obligations to bring in new business and maintain existing
business that associates do not.”).
227. It is also important for a candidate for partnership to create the
perception that he has other opportunities if he is not made partner. For
instance, one lawyer I interviewed related a story about a colleague in his firm
who was being considered for equity partner. She was a binder for a very
important client of the firm. However, she and the partner who originated that
business were the same age, and consequently, her strong relationship with the
client did not increase the chances that the client would remain with the firm
after the finder who originated the business retired because she would be retiring
at the same time. The partner evaluation committee recommended this lawyer
for equity partner, but the management committee rejected the recommendation,
a first to this lawyer’s knowledge. Because this candidate had two children in
college, there was speculation in the firm that the management committee felt
certain they could refuse to elevate this lawyer to equity partner, and she would
not leave the firm. When I described this situation to an equity partner at
another firm, he confirmed that “the first question that is asked is will [the
lawyer] leave if we don’t make him a partner.”
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meeting where four non-equity partners met with him and the
managing partner of the firm to discuss a difficult issue:
I can look down the table and tell you who will
make it and who won’t. You know it when you see
it, the type of person who will be “accretive.” The
first lawyer is the smartest person in the room. She
will only make equity partner if she has a very
strong political rabbi.228 She will never be able to
instill confidence in a client. A client will never
look at her and think “she will take care of me.”
She will always need a translator who can
communicate her advice to clients. The next guy is
not quite as smart and has the same problem. The
third guy at the table is another [dissent reader] but
he has pretensions of worldliness. When he talks,
he leans into the conference table. It’s as if
someone told him that “players lean in” when they
speak. Who knows, maybe this guy will make it.
Sometimes if you wear the shoes long enough they
fit. The last guy at the table is the complete natural.
He is self possessed, entirely articulate, only speaks
when he has something to say, not to hear himself
talk. When he talks, no one interrupts him and he
adds something new. I’d bet dollars to donuts this
guy will be an equity partner within a few years.
Thus, creating the right perceptions for promotion requires
understanding what public face a partner is expected to adopt in a
given situation. A lawyer must be skilled in reading situations and
understanding the public face called for at a given time and place
in order to successfully navigate the road to advancement in a
large-firm. Although the non-equity partner with “pretensions of
worldliness” is not able to wear the public face comfortably at this
point, in the department head’s view, he has a greater chance of
making equity partner than the first two lawyers because he, at
228. “Rabbi” is the term the lawyer used. It was not a term widely used
among my interviewees.
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least, understands the need to create a public face appropriate to
the situation. The “natural” not only understands this, he is able to
229
do it seamlessly.
The department head sees these same four lawyers’
approaches to an issue about a discrepancy in pay—their
understanding or lack of understanding of the etiquette required in
the situation—as indicative of their suitability for promotion. One
department head told me:
When I met with them individually before this
meeting, [the first three lawyers at the table] whined
about the disparity in pay. The “natural” says to
me, “I’m upset and you can write down that I am
upset, but tell the guys at the top, I’ll take a $50,000
pay cut if they will give me first chair in a trial for a
Fortune 50 client. I can make a career out of that.”
This guy sees the macro.
...
[He] is not a management problem—I don’t have to
manage this guy. The dissent readers are the
problem. I have to manage them . . . . You have to
bring the world to these guys.
They don’t
understand it themselves.”
For the department head, the question for promotion purposes
was not whether any of these four lawyers was ready to try a case
for a Fortune 50 client, but which of them knew it was appropriate
in response to a pay discrepancy issue to project a public face of
confidence and eagerness. In this way, large-firm litigators
routinely equate appearances with substance. Their habit of mind
is to attend to, and make crucial judgments on, the basis of
perceptions.

229. Lawyers I interviewed had a variety of names for the “natural”
including the “superstar” and the “complete athlete.” The lawyers this subject
referred to as “dissent readers,” lawyers who are bright but lack the ability to
discern and meet expectations about the perceptions they need to create, were
also referred to as the “guy who wore black socks to gym class.”
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This department head, and other lawyers I interviewed who
are skilled at reading expectations, expressed significant frustration
with lawyers who do not recognize the need to create the right
perceptions and/or are not able to read expectations about what
public face is appropriate in a given situation. Their failure to
understand the logic of their firms makes them unqualified for
promotion. These lawyers are at best naïve, and at worst,
“management problems” because they will not understand why
they are not advancing and are likely to become dissatisfied with
their stagnated careers. But even those lawyers who can read
expectations and manage their public faces accordingly face
uncertainty because what is expected always changes.
2. Paradigm Shifts and the Premium on the Ability to Change
Expectations often change as new lawyers take over positions
of power within management or when the lawyers in power decide
to change the strategic plan. Changes in the strategic plan may
prompt changes in the rhetoric used in the firm. For instance, one
lawyer noted that management at his firm stressed “total quality
client service.” This was the “buzz phrase” in his firm. In a later
interview with another lawyer in the same firm, it became apparent
that, after hiring a consulting firm, firm management had decided
to focus on branding certain practice groups, and that “branding”
was the new buzz phrase. Many firms employ consultants to assist
230
them in formulating their strategic plans. These consultants sell
230. A cottage industry of consultants specializing in advising large law
firms has developed over the last several decades. See C. Marcus Harris, Use of
Consultants by Lawyers,
in GARY A. MUNNEKE, LAW PRACTICE
MANAGEMENT: MATERIALS AND CASES, 144–51 (1991) (documenting the
growth of consultants providing advice to law firms on topics ranging from
internal partnership relations, to compensation, to advertising and marketing);
see also About Altman & Weil, at http://www.altmanweil.com/about.cfm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2005) (documenting the formation of the firm in 1970, services
offered, and its current status as the only consulting firm “specializing in legal
organizations” listed in the Consultant’s News top 100 management consulting
firms); Hildebrandt International, Legal Consulting Services, at
http://www.hildebrandt.com/ConsultingServices.aspx?BD_ID=4858 (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (describing firm’s 25
year history and services offered to law firms to improve internal structure,

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

2005

Large Law Firm Ethics

699

advice about marketing and management strategies that they claim
will make firms successful. A former managing partner explains:
Consultants claim to have information no one else
has and this is what they sell. The firms are looking
for the “Promised Land” and the consultants tell
them they’ve been to the top of the mountain and
seen what no one else has seen. The firms could do
all of this themselves, there is no magic to it.
Armed with a consultant’s advice, management has
“credibility” when it makes a decision to promote one practice
group over another, or to reward one activity more generously than
another in the firm’s compensation formula. A couple of years
later, consultants will inevitably come back with new information
and advice, changing the strategic plan and associated
expectations. In other words, as the strategic plan changes,
management’s norms often change.
Shifts in the strategic plan can have enormous consequences
for lawyers trying to advance in large firms. A non-equity partner
in his thirteenth year at his firm describes the “paradigm shifts”
that have complicated his quest for equity partnership at his firm.
He explains:
During my first four years at the firm, there were
two categories of lawyers at the firm; the people
who brought in the work and the people who did the
work. There was a paradigm shift [somewhere
between] my five to ten year mark. Then the idea
du jour was “everyone needs to bring in business.”
Everything was about marketing. “Everyone needs
to become a rainmaker.” If you didn’t, you were
looked on negatively or forced out. I focused on
rainmaking. I’m a good schmoozer. I brought in
$400K as a [young] associate one year. This was
more than some of the litigation partners were
bringing in. [Firm management] would ask me to
efficiency and profitability).
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be on panels for seminars for associates about
rainmaking. I was [held up as an example,] well
regarded.
In the last two to three years the idea du jour has
been “driving work.” Litigators are supposed to
expand the business coming from existing clients
(usually clients of other departments). Now we are
being told “don’t waste time rainmaking; litigators
can’t generate business.” Now you need to be the
“go to guy” for a corporate guy who needs a
litigator. [Now I’m in a difficult position]. I
haven’t worked on establishing relationships within
the firm and I don’t want to be working for [a
corporate partner]. I like autonomy. Every time the
paradigm shifts it sends me into a tailspin.
This lawyer attributed this latest paradigm shift to a change in
firm management and a subsequent change in the strategic plan.
The firm had recently merged with a smaller litigation boutique.
The leading lawyer in the boutique firm had a large and very
profitable client base and was made head of litigation as part of the
merger agreement. When he became department head, the
expectations for litigators in the firm changed.
[The new head of litigation] says marketing is
“bullshit.” He sat me down and said, “What are you
doing?” He told me that in all his years of practice
he has never marketed. He made himself the “go to
guy” for all the corporate people.
He says
“litigators can’t generate business; they must be
driving business.” He told me he has buy in from
senior people in the firm on this, so a litigator can
qualify for equity partner by expanding business
and compensation will also reflect the value of this
activity.
Assuming a lawyer is able to keep up with his firm’s paradigm
shifts, to be promoted, he also needs to be lucky.
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3. Luck—the Trump Card
To be promoted in large law firms today, a lawyer must be in
the right place at the right time. The relative status of the lawyer’s
practice group at the time he is being considered for non-equity
and equity partner will be a deciding factor in promotion decisions.
As a seventh year associate at a large national firm puts it, to make
partner, “[Y]ou need to be a good lawyer, you need to know what
[partners] want from you and give it to them, and you need to be in
a hot practice group.” A practice group is “hot” when it is busy,
profitable, and has a place in the firm’s strategic plan.
The same associate noted that the hot practice group can
change rapidly. He identified Mergers and Acquisitions, Corporate
Finance and Venture Capital as three practice groups that had been
hot, but had suffered recent reversals of fortune because of changes
in the financial markets that would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for associates in those groups to make partner at the
231
time of our interview. Changes in the firm’s strategic plan may
also affect which practice group is hot in a firm at any given time.
As a litigation department head explains:232
[We] have a high level insurance coverage litigation
practice. The firm doesn’t want to be known as an
insurance coverage firm, however, that work tends
to be countercyclical. So it is good work to have.
Some of the partners in the insurance coverage
practice can be some of the higher paid people in
the firm. But the firm is not going to work at
growing that practice group; we won’t be doing a
lot of new hiring there; we won’t be making a lot of
new capital partners in that area.
231. Wilkins and Gulati note the pivotal role of external market forces in
their reconception of the promotion to partner tournament and argue that
associates bear the risk of market fluctuations in the tournament. Wilkins &
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1660–61.
232. My research indicates that the firm’s strategic plan also plays a
pivotal role in who wins and loses the tournament. Again, it is the associates
who bear the risk that changes in the strategic plan may change the criteria for
success in the tournament.
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Consequently, an associate or non-equity partner who chose a
specialty in his first several years at a firm can only hope that
seven-to-nine years later, when he is being considered for nonequity partner and when he is considered for equity partner
thereafter, his practice group is busy, profitable, and has a
prominent place in the firm’s strategic plan.
C. Success in the Competition for Resources
Lawyers who are promoted to partner must continue to
accurately read and meet colleagues’ and firm management’s
expectations and manage perceptions. For example, most firms
recognize subjective criteria relating to partners contributions to
the firm in their compensation decisions. This subjective criterion
is referred to by different names in each firm, for example, “good
citizenship credit” or “glue” (as in holding the firm together.)
Willingness to spend time on associate training, participate in
client pitches, respond to requests for information from potential
clients, prepare marketing materials, serve on firm committees, and
work to generate new business are all viewed, to varying degrees,
as contributions to the health of the firm. Thus, some portion of an
equity partner’s compensation will turn on the compensation
committee’s perceptions about the partner’s contribution to the
day-to-day administration of the firm.
Further, an equity partner may want to grow his practice by
hiring more paralegals or associates for his practice group. He
may want some of his most valuable senior associates promoted to
partner, or he may want the firm to market his practice. To
accomplish any of these, he must understand what perceptions he
needs to create to win management’s support in the competition for
these resources and wage his battles accordingly. It is also crucial
that he understand the proper etiquette for waging these battles.
Ann, an equity partner and practice group leader with a
successful and growing practice, describes the competition for
resources between her and another practice group leader.
Together, Ann and Rob built the litigation department in their
office into a substantial practice. Ann explained that both of their
practices have strengths and weaknesses. Ann’s practice is rate
sensitive (meaning the clients do not pay top hourly rates) but
gives the firm exposure to the heads of Fortune 500 companies.
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Rob’s clients pay premium rates, but Ann says his Achilles heel is
that his practice lacks “cachet” and does not give the firm exposure
to high profile, potential clients. Ann states:
[Rob] and I are in a battle right now about whose
practice gets preeminence and resources. The firm
is now at the stage where we are trying to get the
profits per partner number up. So the equity partner
pie needs to stay small to attract talent, [meaning]
premium practices from other firms. [This means
the firm will only make a few new capital partners].
[We are competing for resources,] but we [present
ourselves] as arm-in-arm, a team. We would never
say anything outright to each other, or others, but
the battle is going on. I’m in one corner with my
troops and Rob is in the other with his troops.
Neither of us would say what I just said to you to
anyone at the firm, but both of us are trying to sell
our practices internally.
Another lawyer talks about the etiquette required in the
competition for resources in his firm. “The whole system is selfinterest driven, but no one talks about it this way. Everyone talks
about it as an altruistic system or talks about it in a communal
sense. But so much of what partners are doing is being done to
promote their own value.”
In addition to employing the proper etiquette in the
competition for resources, lawyers must create the right
perceptions about their contributions and abilities. An equity
partner explains:
You have to keep track of your client pitches to
make sure that everyone knows that you’ve done
them . . . . Some of this will be done subtly and
some not so subtly. People are trying to make sure
they stay noticed. There will be five people on a
pitch. When they get back to the office only one
person may talk about having gone on the pitch.
But that person talks . . . so people associate him
with going out and generating and finding new
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business. The person who is talking may not be the
person who did the most work on the pitch, or had
the client connection, . . . but it’s all about the
perception. Eventually, the perceptions may get
clarified, however, the partner who talked a lot
about involvement in the pitch has already created a
perception that [he’s] generating a lot of business.
E-mail is a vehicle for creating perceptions in many firms.
One lawyer says:
These
broadcast
e-mails
are
essentially
advertisements. A partner, or even an associate,
will send out a broadcast e-mail saying, “I’m going
to be making a pitch to client X. If anyone has any
contacts at client X, please contact me
immediately.” [Or an] e-mail will go out saying
“we have a client doing X, if you have expertise in
this area, please contact me.” [Or] “I was just
appointed to X firm committee, and in doing my
work for the committee, it would be helpful if you
have any information on X, if you would forward it
to me.” These [e-mails] are really just a way to stay
noticed, to make people think you have a big book
of business or clout with management.
In many firms, an equity partner must also create the
perception that he has the support of the lawyers working under
him. For example, David relayed the following story about his
competition with Bill for resources. Tension about compensation
of non-equity partners developed when both David and Bill hired
lateral non-equity partners at a higher rate of compensation than
the home grown non-equity partners received. David and Bill
structured their respective lateral hires’ compensation in different
ways. The homegrown non-equity partners were angry about both
compensation packages. David explained:
This became a huge battleground for us. We were
vying for the role of the good guy who is looking
out for you. It was like politics—campaigning for
the troops’ allegiance. [Both of us were saying to
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the non-equity partners,] “I’m looking out for you,
this is good for you.” To be credible in the
institution you need a groundswell of support from
the non-capital partners behind you. We were both
going from office to office campaigning one-on-one
with the non-capital partners.
Equity partners create these perceptions to encourage the
loyalty of good non-equity partners and associates who seek to
form alliances with partners they believe have the influence needed
to help them achieve partner status. One equity partner stated:
There is a lot of, I don’t want to say deception, but
illusion in this process. Partners try to convince
younger lawyers they have clout. Some do it to
make themselves look more powerful; for instance,
“because of me, you were put on this committee.”
It is also important to have more people working in
your practice area, this makes your practice group
look busy and important . . . . These illusions are
used to corral resources. Partners are trying to
make themselves look important . . . .
It is also crucial for a practice group to create the right
perceptions in order to win the competition among practice groups
for resources. For instance, it is important that practice groups
appear busy. An equity partner explains:
The Practice Group leader has an interest in getting
everyone in the group working. Data is [tracked] on
the average hours worked in each group every
month. If an associate does not get his or her time
in, it makes it look like the group is not working
hard because the average goes down. This may be
misinformation if the group is really working hard
and it puts the group in a bad position. Associates
often don’t understand this.
A former managing partner agrees, “[N]ot being busy is death
in a law firm. And it is a perception that is hard to change.” This

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

706

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 4

premium on perceptions is a central feature of the organizational
logic of large firms.
VII. DECISION-MAKING IN LARGE LAW FIRMS
Lawyers make decisions against the backdrop of the
organizational logic of their firms. They make both legal and
ethical judgments. Many of these judgments fall within “gray
areas” where there are no hard and fast rules to guide decisionmaking. For example, lawyers make judgments about whether to
employ a targeted or a “kitchen sink” approach to litigation. A
“kitchen sink” approach is one in which they would pursue every
advantage, including making every non-frivolous argument or
objection available to them. Lawyers also make decisions about
how aggressive to be with opposing counsel.
Lawyers at the top of the case hierarchy often delegate
decision-making to the lawyers working under them. Because
finders and binders are under pressure to expand existing work,
bring in new work, and be available to their clients and colleagues,
there are tremendous pressures on their time. In addition clients
pressure firms to keep fees low. Consequently, the incentives for
finders and binders to delegate work to “cheaper” lawyers are
substantial. When they delegate work, finders and binders look for
lawyers who can manage some of their cases, meaning lawyers
who will take work off their desks and make decisions without
233
needing constant handholding. An equity partner expressed his
frustration with lawyers who are unable to do this: “You can see it

233. Senior lawyers’ motivation for delegating work in large law firms
appears to be quite different from senior corporate managers’ motives when they
delegate work. See JACKALL, supra note 6, at 78, 80 (reporting that in corporate
bureaucracies decision-making was pushed down the ladder so that those on top
could deny involvement if the decision did not “pan out”). The lawyers I
interviewed agreed that when a junior lawyer makes a decision that turns out to
have been wrong in hindsight, the client will hold the senior lawyer, the lawyer
with the client relationship, responsible for the decision. Thus, delegating and
discouraging questions appears to be a result of 1) a desire not to do the least
desirable work, 2) the tremendous pressure on the finders’ and binders’ time,
and 3) pressure from clients to delegate work to the most cost effective lawyers
in the firm.
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when an associate doesn’t have it. They ask questions constantly,
they don’t want to make decisions, they don’t move the ball
forward; they have no clear sense of how to move the ball
forward.”
Although the lawyers at the top of the case hierarchy want the
lawyers to whom they delegate work to make decisions, a lawyer
working for another lawyer does not have autonomy when making
decisions. An equity partner described how her decision-making
changes when she is not the top lawyer in the case hierarchy. She
describes her work as falling into three categories: “mine, ours, and
service work.” The work she describes as “mine” is work she does
for clients she brought into the firm. The work she describes as
“ours” is work she does as the “binder” for Jeff, her powerful
mentor’s large clients. “Service” work is work she does for
lawyers in other areas of the firm. She explains:
I make all of the decisions on the cases that are
“mine.” I sometimes handle the “ours” cases on my
own . . . . I have worked with [Jeff] for so long that
I know how he will answer most questions and so I
don’t ask much. When I don’t know the partner or
the client as well, I am more careful about making
decisions and will ask what the partner wants to do.
Lawyers working for other lawyers must know how their
supervisor would handle a situation and must handle it the same
way because supervisors are not looking for lawyers who will
make any decision; they are looking for the lawyers who will make
234
the right decisions. They must make the right decisions without
asking too many questions and without making mistakes that will

234. In some cases the supervising lawyer is the finder who originated the
business and the binder is working to make the right decisions. At other times,
the supervising lawyer is a binder who grew the litigation business coming from
a client. In these circumstances, relevant binders may look for minders to
manage cases for them and those minders must make what the binder believes
are the right decisions. Thus, both minders, and in some circumstances, binders
must work to meet their supervisors’ expectations.
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make the supervising lawyer look bad to the client or to the firm.235
As a successful equity partner observes:
The minders are the folks who are being squeezed.
For litigators the most difficult position is being in
the middle between the senior partner and the
associate. The associate just does what he or she is
told. The minder is supposed to take part of the load
off the senior person. This means making some
calls. [They] need to try to figure out what the
senior partner would do and hope [they] were right.
What constitutes the right decision or the appropriate
judgment on a question will vary depending for whom the lawyer
is working. A minder must discern how the particular partner he is
working for would want something done. Astute junior lawyers
learn that they need to understand and conform to individual
partner’s judgments on everything from style to legal strategy.
One junior lawyer stated:
The summer associates were assigned work with a
primary and secondary lawyer. The primary lawyer
was a partner; the secondary lawyer was a more
senior associate. The better associates would tell
you this partner wants X, Y, and Z. For instance,
235. Wilkins and Gulati’s work with tournament theory predicts this
phenomenon. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 98, at 538–39. They state:
First, partners will have a preference for associates who need
little or no training. Monitoring the work of other lawyers is
both difficult and expensive. Partners want to staff their
projects with associates who will be able to do the work with
relatively little supervision. Finding lawyers who can perform
work competently and quickly is the preeminent selection
criterion.
Id. Wilkins and Gulati report anecdotal evidence that suggests “black lawyers
may develop risk-averse strategies performing their work,” such as “ask[ing]
more clarifying questions when receiving assignments” and speaking less at
meetings with clients. Id. at 576–77. My research confirms that lawyers who
develop these kinds of risk-averse strategies are less likely to create the
perceptions they need to create to advance within the firm.
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there was a standard interoffice memo form, but
you always had to check with the associate to make
sure that this partner wasn’t looking for something
different. Or the associate might tell you that
although the partner said he wanted something back
from the summer associate in two weeks, he really
wants an answer in two days.
Lawyers must also conform to clients’ preferences regarding
the work they do. This junior lawyer further stated:
Each [in-house lawyer at the company] has a
different style. You have to know what each one
wants. One may want all memos in bullet point
form and a plain English version of the issues.
Another wants a traditional legal research memo
with extensive citations. I give them each what they
want. Some associates refuse to adapt to the
client’s style. They say “this is who I am and I’m
236
not changing.”
Making the right decisions includes conforming to the
partner’s expectations (norms) about everything from a lawyer’s
stance in interactions with adversaries to the legal arguments and
strategies he pursues. For example, a third year law student who
worked as a summer associate at a large firm notes, “I watched
associates take more aggressive stances with opponents [on certain
cases] because they knew that’s what the partner on the case would
do.” Another lawyer reported moving for summary judgment on
more issues than he would have otherwise so that he would not
appear weak to his supervisor.
When asked whether it is important that an associate be able
to adapt to clients’ preferences, an equity partner acknowledged it
is important. However, he said he also wants an associate to
exercise “independent judgment.” When asked how he knows

236. This associate noted that the associates who refused to adapt left the
firm. He was not sure whether they left of their own accord or if they were
asked to leave.
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whether an associate is exercising independent judgment, he said,
“I ask them what they think we should do. I’ll ask, ‘How do you
think we should respond to this complaint? Should we file a
motion to dismiss? What arguments would you make?’” Earlier
in the interview, this partner discussed associates who did not
make partner in his firm. He identified poor substantive or
professional judgment as determining factors in the decision not to
make these associates partners. When asked to describe an
associate who did not make partner, he said:
It is the kind of person who chooses a less
persuasive argument then they might have on a
legal issue; that would be an example of poor
substantive judgment.
An example of poor
professional judgment is doing something other
than what the partner asked for. [I can think of an
associate whom we did not elect partner because he
had poor professional judgment.] The partner had
said something needed to be done by a certain
deadline. The associate did something different by
the deadline and never discussed the change in
strategy with the partner.
Thus, when a lawyer’s judgment varies from the supervising
partner’s judgment, he must obtain the supervisor’s approval to
exercise his judgment. When a junior lawyer prepares a draft for a
supervisor’s review or is expected to ask questions, many
supervisors want him to come back with his own, better ideas. An
equity partner said:
I look for an associate who “comes to play;” an
associate who will take a proprietary interest in the
case. A weak associate will give me a draft of a
brief that is “half assed” and merely regurgitates my
ideas. I want someone who will come back with his
own, better arguments. I don’t want an associate
who is high maintenance.
However, when the supervisor wants a minder to make a call
without asking questions, it is essential for the minder to be able to
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read the partner’s expectations accurately and “do what [the
partner] would have done” without making mistakes.237
This means minders spend much of their time making
judgments about what a partner would want in a given situation, as
opposed to exercising their own judgment. As a result, many
large-firm associates are insecure about their skills. An equity
partner observed:
I can spot a large-firm associate in seconds at a
dinner party because they feel like frauds—you can
see it. They are apologetic—they tell me what firm
they work for before they tell me what they do.
With a small firm lawyer, they are interested in their
work and talk about the work; they do they’ll tell
you—I have this employment case . . . .
Although the sought after minders (those who know what
judgments they are expected to make and make them) may not
develop confidence in their own judgment, at the promotion stage,
it is imperative that they appear confident.
VIII. THE MORAL ETHOS OF LARGE-FIRM LITIGATORS
Across firms, successful large-firm lawyers follow a
distinctive choice of norm rule. As they climb case hierarchies and
negotiate their firms’ management bureaucracies, they develop
related habits of mind.238 They look to the lawyers they are
working for and with, and those who matter to them at the time, as
the source of norms. As large firms have grown and become more
bureaucratic under the leadership of their elite partners, the norms
espoused by partners within those firms have become more varied.
237. For some associates, particularly some junior associates at the very
bottom of the case hierarchy, the need to give the lawyers above them what they
want without making mistakes causes them to resort to cautious decisionmaking. “The task of the first through third year associates was impossible.
You can’t make any mistakes. Associates said to me ‘don’t be noticeable; if you
have a choice between not being noticed and doing something outstanding
which may potentially bomb, don’t take the risk.’”
238. See supra note 23.
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Firms hire lateral partners who bring new norms to the firm.
Large-firm lawyers must not only meet the expectations of the
lawyers who supervise their work; they must also meet the
expectations of the network of lawyer managers who “manage”
them. When firms merge or acquire new practice groups, power
shifts and norms change. Frequently, norms also change when the
lawyers managing the firm adopt a new strategic plan.
As a result, large-firm litigators are accustomed to “looking up
239
and around” whenever they make decisions, and they become
highly attuned to the personalities and preferences of the lawyers
for whom they work. When they survey the social landscapes of
their firms, they see terrain shaped by individual personalities,
styles and preferences. Expectations or norms about what hours
they work, what kinds of work they do, how they do their work,
what decisions to make, what public face to wear and etiquette to
follow in a given situation vary depending on who a lawyer is
working for and who has power at the time.
In this environment, it is not the norms espoused by the firms’
elite partners that will shape large-firm lawyers ethical
consciousness. It is the choice of norm rule that requires they
identify and meet the expectations of those who matter that will
shape their consciousness. The choice of norm rule large-firm
lawyers follow in their work life tends to make notions of right and
wrong, proper and improper, mutable in the lawyers’ eyes.
In addition, large-firm lawyers are accustomed to being
judged and judging others by the perceptions they create. This
intense attention to perceptions leads large-firm lawyers to collapse
the distinction between appearances and substance. In important
respects, appearance becomes substance in large firms. Some
large-firm lawyers are more attuned than others to the preferences
of their supervisors and colleagues and to the perceptions they are
expected to create. This ability to understand and follow the rules
of the fluid organizational game is of preeminent importance in
large firms. It is the lawyers who have most thoroughly adopted
this habit of mind and are able to act on the logic of their firms
who succeed in today’s large firms. They are the superstars.

239.

JACKALL, supra note 6, at 77.

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

2005

Large Law Firm Ethics

713

A. Ethics as a Function of the Large-Firm Litigator’s Habits of
Mind
My research is designed to identify the organizational logic of
large firms, the habits of mind and evaluative rules (e.g., the choice
of norm rule) that guide large-firm lawyers in their work. In
240
contrast, the Ethics: Beyond the Rules project was designed to
investigate “the prevalence and likely causes of, and possible
remedies for, ethically inappropriate or problematic behavior in
large-firm litigation practice, especially in the area of discovery.”241
The project’s scholars were particularly interested in “areas of
problematic conduct ‘beyond the rules’ as well as in plain
242
violations of ethical and practice rules.” Based on their empirical
study of large-firm litigators in two large cities, each of the sociolegal scholars involved in the project published an essay
interpreting the data gathered from his or her own perspective and
area of expertise.243
Several themes emerged in these essays that suggest that the
organizational logic that guides large-firm lawyers in their quest
for success and advancement within their firms, described in Part
V, supra, also influences their ethical consciousness. When asked
to define ethical and unethical behavior, the Ethics: Beyond the
Rules informants244 had difficulty doing so because what they
245
considered ethical was highly dependent on situational factors.
When the researchers pushed their informants to define ethical
240. See supra text accompanying note 4.
241. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-firm Litigators:
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 709 (1998).
242. Id. at 709–10.
243. Id.
244. In Ethics: Beyond the Rules, Mark Suchman referred to the lawyers
interviewed as “informants.” See Suchman, supra note 10, at 843. Where it is
otherwise not clear, I refer to them as the “informants” to distinguish them from
the lawyers I interviewed.
245. Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of
Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 705–06 (1998) (noting
that “[a]ll of the papers, using slightly different labels, note the discussants’
avoidance or suspicion of any moral calculus in their daily choices. Decisionmaking was described as ‘situational’ or pragmatic, thinking ‘realistic’ and
instrumental, standards as external, and ethical limits defined solely by rules”).
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norms rather than rely on situational factors, the informants did
two interesting things. First, they tended to define right and wrong
in terms of what others might think and, second, they elevated
civility to an ethical norm.246 Finally, these litigators’ professional
ideal was “a game well-played”247 meaning a game played by the
established conventions.
1. Ethical Decision-Making Characterized by Situational
Judgment and Reference to Other People’s Morals
Mark Suchman observed, “[A]lmost always, the first assertion
about the content of ‘Ethics: Beyond the Rules’ was ‘it depends’—
often followed by a very tentative and unsatisfying list of
conditions upon which it depended.”248 All of the other scholars
involved in the Ethics: Beyond the Rules project made similar
observations.249 Robert Nelson described the phenomenon this
way:
The biggest problem with getting the lawyers to talk
about the gray areas in their own professional
decision-making was the salience of situational
factors to evaluating “proper practice.” The answer
to almost every question was that it “depends.”
Aggressiveness generally is inappropriate, unless
the war was initiated by the other side. Hardball
usually is inappropriate unless there is a specter of
mischievous plaintiffs’ lawyers waiting to use the
information from discovery for other suits. The
hallmark of good lawyering is managing the
relationship with [the] clients so that no ethical lines
need to be drawn in the sand.250

246. Suchman, supra note 10, at 847–48.
247. Id. at 870–71.
248. Id. at 847.
249. Frenkel, supra note 245, at 705–06.
250. Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame:
Professional and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable,
Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORD. L. REV. 773
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Thus, a large-firm litigator’s definition of ethical conduct
varies depending on the conduct of his adversary. The situational
factors the informants considered also included the client’s
instructions, or in the absence of instructions, the relative strength
of the client’s position, the client’s interests and desires,251 and the
consequences of a chosen course of conduct, including the
likelihood of being caught or damaging one’s reputation.252 Nelson
labeled the apparent command that the informants consult
253
situational factors, the “imperative of situational judgment.”
The “imperative of situational judgment”254 is an extension of
the organizational logic large-firm lawyers develop in response to
the social structure of their firms. The choice of norm rule at work
in large firms makes right and wrong fluid concepts for the largefirm litigator. Fixed standards are anathema in a world where “the
final arbiter of the quality of your work is not the client, the judge,
255
or any external truth, it’s the partner you’re working for.”
When pushed to move beyond situational factors to define a
normative standard of right and wrong, several of the Ethics:
Beyond the Rules scholars observed that large-firm litigators
defined right and wrong in terms of what other audiences might
think. One noted:
Among large-firm litigators, associates [in contrast
to partners] readily acknowledged the moral
dimensions of their work, but often collapsed these
into pragmatic concerns. Thus, for example, they
frequently discussed morality in terms of how an
action would appear in a newspaper or to a judge or
jury. These imaginary external audiences seemed to

(1998). See also Gordon, supra note 241, at 714–15; Suchman, supra note 10,
at 847.
251. Gordon, supra note 241, at 714.
252. Suchman, supra note 10, at 847.
253. Nelson, supra note 250, at 780.
254. Id.
255. See supra note 1.
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provide a “reality check,” or, in the words of one
associate, an “objective moral standard.”256
Robert Gordon, another scholar involved in the project, made
a similar observation:
According to our study, lawyers pondering a course
of action will ask themselves, or each other, how a
description of it would sound in front of a spectator,
how it would sound to a judge, (often-mentioned)
how it would look “in the newspaper,” “in the right
hand column of The Wall Street Journal,” or to their
“mother.” . . . Moral judgment, in other words, is
something that others possess and may bring to
bear; the lawyer’s task is to anticipate that
judgment. He does not consult some internalized
set of ethical or professional norms, such as what
would be fair, honest, and just, in this situation, or
what is the most consistent with the kind of person
or lawyer I would like to be. Rather, one asks, what
257
would others think?
Again, the Ethics: Beyond the Rules informants’ working
ethics are entirely consistent with the habits of mind of looking up
and looking around and equating appearance with substance that I
observed in large-firm litigators. Perceptions are the “substance”
on which many important decisions are made in large firms. As a
result, day in and day out, large-firm litigators ask themselves:
what would others think is the right perception to create in this
situation. What constitutes the right perception depends on who
you are working for or who your audience will be. It is not
surprising, therefore, that when the Ethics: Beyond the Rules
informants tried to identify ethical norms, they approached the task
not by consulting internal standards or codified rules of conduct,
but by reference to the expectations of relevant audiences, e.g.,

256.
257.

Suchman, supra note 10, at 844–45.
Gordon, supra note 237, at 732.
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supervisors, clients, judges, and the media.258 For large-firm
litigators, acting ethically was appearing ethical to a relevant
259
hypothetical audience.
2. The Lawyer’s Role: Lawyer-as-Agent
The organizational logic of large firms is also a powerful
influence on large-firm litigators’ conception of the adversarial
norm and of their roles within that norm vis-à-vis their clients.
The large-firm litigators’ habit of mind of looking up and looking
around is superimposed on the norms created by the adversarial
system, and, consequently, it shapes their understanding of those
norms. The reshaped norms, in turn, serve to rationalize the social
structure of large law firms.
The Ethics: Beyond the Rules scholars made a number of
interesting observations about the norms of the adversarial system
and the related norms in the area of client relationships, as
understood by their informants. Nelson observed that “most
litigators defined their moral obligations almost strictly in terms of
the role they played in the adversarial process. That is, they had a
duty of zealous representation to their client but not a duty to step
outside that role to attempt to achieve a more moral resolution of
260
conflict.” However, as Gordon explained, the relationship of the
adversarial norm to other competing norms has changed in recent
years. Gordon stated:
At one time (in theory, anyway; what happened in
actual practice is obscure,) lawyers generally
understood that this norm was constrained by, and
had to be balanced against, other norms, namely
those general duties owed by lawyers as “officers of
the court” to the framework of substantive and
procedural rules that structure the adversary system.
But over the course of this century, especially in

258.
732.
259.
260.

See Suchman, supra note 10, at 844–45; Gordon supra note 237, at
See id.
Nelson, supra note 250, at 779.
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recent years, those generally countervailing norms
have been both weakened and reduced to rules.
Instead of being confronted with two general
obligations in permanent tension, which must
constantly be balanced against one another, lawyers
face only one dominant master norm: a client’s
interest is to be zealously advanced, qualified only
by particular positive rules.261
Thus, lawyers have elevated the duty to zealously represent
their clients over other competing obligations, and the procedural
and ethical rules that constrain lawyers’ conduct are just another
set of rules to be gamed, interpreted, and argued in the effort to
advance the client’s interests.262 Suchman concluded that the
Ethics: Beyond the Rules informants viewed the duty of zealous
advocacy as “an affirmative moral obligation, even when it came
into conflict with other ethical rules.”263 For instance, many
informants saw conferring with their witnesses during a rest break
in a deposition as an affirmative moral obligation, even if the court
rules in the jurisdiction prohibited such conversations.264 In the
context of deposition defense, the affirmative moral obligation that
the lawyer zealously defend his client meant that “walking the line
[pushing the limits of the rules] was the preferred position for the
265
morally responsible attorney.”
At the same time that zealous representation of the client has
become an affirmative moral obligation for the Ethics: Beyond the
Rules litigators, their view of their roles and relationships with
their clients has changed. Although the notion of lawyer-ascounselor has long been a professional ideal,266 when pushed to
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Gordon, supra note 241, at 728.
Id. at 737.
Suchman, supra note 10, at 854 (emphasis added).
Id. at 851.
Id. at 854 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 228 (1994)
(arguing that lawyers need to return to their traditional role as advisors to their
clients); Bruce A. Green, Thoughts about Corporate Lawyers After Reading the
Cigarette Papers: Has the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?,
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define norms in the area of client relations, Suchman noted that the
large-firm litigators fell into two camps: those who saw themselves
as agents of the client and those who saw themselves as
fiduciaries.267 The litigators in the lawyer-as-agent camp saw
themselves in “a passive position as an agent of the client’s will—
and pass[ed] moral responsibility along to the client-asprincipal.”268 The litigators who saw themselves as fiduciaries
“asserted that they would make at least a cursory effort at moral
269
suasion if they felt that their client was in the wrong.” Suchman
notes that the lawyer-as-agent view was the dominant of the two
among the large-firm litigators involved in the study.270 The
informants felt they had an affirmative moral obligation to
zealously represent their clients, and the majority of them saw
themselves as agents of their clients, not counselors. In other
words, a majority of the Ethics: Beyond the Rules litigators
believed they had an affirmative obligation to zealously represent
their client’s will, without any obligation to attempt to constrain
that will.
This comes as no great surprise. In Partners with Power,
Nelson argues that large law firms are controlled by those partners
271
The dominant
in the firm with the most lucrative clients.
partners’ ability to retain power within the firm depends on their
continued relationships with their clients.272 As a consequence,
their incentives are not to act as autonomous counselors who serve
as a check on their clients’ desires, but as agents of their clients.273
My empirical research suggests that the very structure of today’s
large-law firm bureaucracies mirrors this economic reality.

51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 407 (2001) (describing the traditional view of the
lawyer as a counselor guided by principles of fairness and equity).
267. Suchman, supra note 10, at 849.
268. Id.
269. Id. (noting that informants stated their best course of action would be
to attempt to persuade their clients pragmatically, for example, by making
reference to what other audiences may think).
270. Id. at 867.
271. PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 224–28, 288–89.
272. Id. at 276–89.
273. Id.
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Large-firm litigators view zealous advocacy as an affirmative
moral obligation and see themselves as agents of their clients
because their habit of mind is to look up and look around. The
lawyer-as-agent norm and the norm that elevates the pursuit of the
client’s interests to an affirmative moral obligation are consistent
with lawyers’ daily experiences within their firms. Junior lawyers
are agents for the lawyers who supervise them. Within their firms,
most large-firm lawyers are not autonomous counselors who
consult internal or fixed standards (i.e., personal moral beliefs or
widely held professional norms) and advise their superiors about
the appropriate course of action. Large-firm litigators approach
their relationships with, and obligations to, their clients the same
way. They must understand their client’s will and they have an
affirmative moral obligation to zealously advance that will.
Because there are few fixed standards of right and wrong within
the firm, there are few obligations that might compete with the
274
client’s goals.
And while these habits of mind shape lawyers’ norms, these
norms, in turn, serve to rationalize the social structure of large
firms. As one of the lawyers I interviewed observes:
[Yes], a downstream lawyer may vary style
depending on who he’s working for: When working
for a take no prisoners’ partner, err on the side of
being more aggressive. For instance, you are filing
a summary judgment motion. You can move on
eight issues; three you think are worthless, but you
insert all eight because you don’t want to be
perceived as weak. But [I don’t see this as a
problem;] even lawyers at the top of the food chain
have to do this. If they have a really aggressive
client they adjust.

274. Mark Suchman notes that many of the in-house lawyers interviewed
in the Ethics: Beyond the Rules project shared the view that outside lawyers
were agents, not fiduciaries. Suchman, supra note 10, at 849–50. No doubt, this
also contributes to large-firm lawyers’ increasing tendency to see themselves as
agents, rather than fiduciaries.

4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM

2005

Large Law Firm Ethics

721

Thus, the adversarial norm that promotes zealous
representation of the client above all competing obligations and the
lawyer-as-agent norm, rationalize the entire food chain in the
large-firm and the “upward looking stances”275 it creates. If the
obligation to zealously represent a client is the overriding
obligation and the litigator is an agent of that client, not a
counselor, then it is appropriate that junior lawyers not define right
and wrong for themselves, but instead look up the food chain and
ask, “[w]hat would the lawyer I’m working for think is right here?”
And the lawyer at the top of the food chain will ask what the client
wants rather than consulting any internalized or fixed standards. In
this way, the adversarial norm and the lawyer-as-agent norm
articulated by the Ethics: Beyond the Rules litigators justify the
276
social structure of the large law firm.
3. Ethics Defined as Civility—Appearances Equated with Content
Like their upward looking stances, the large-firm lawyers’
habit of mind that equates appearances with substance also
influences lawyers’ ethical consciousness. In my own fieldwork, I
found that lawyers equated civility (i.e., following what they
defined as the appropriate etiquette) with ethics. For instance,
when I asked a mid-level associate whether the lawyers she
opposed were ethical, she told me that she usually faced “the
highest caliber lawyers” on the other side of her cases—lawyers
who are “extremely ethical in their behavior.” By way of example,
she relayed a story about an arbitration in which she had been
involved where the arbitrator had commended the lawyers
involved on their professionalism. I asked her how she knew the
lawyers on the other side had produced all the responsive
documents in discovery. She explained:

275. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 5–6 (using the term “upward looking
stances” to describe the habits of mind of corporate managers).
276. Robert Nelson notes that the imperative of situational judgment
rationalizes the independence of the case hierarchies within large law firms.
Nelson, supra note 250, at 781. Because ethical judgments are governed by
situational factors, it would be inappropriate for one partner to question another
partner’s handling of his cases. Id.
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[T]here was not a problem with scheduling
depositions, there was nothing said in the briefs that
was stretching the facts or the law, I could tell from
the way they were behaving in the deposition that
they weren’t being obstructionists. You can tell
because at the end of the day somebody who has
integrity knows that it’s not personal, they shake
hands; these are professional lawyers. I call . . . the
other side and sa[y] “These are my witnesses, will
you tell me yours?” And the other side . . . give[s]
me their witnesses. These lawyers are advocating
strongly but it is done in a professional manner.
You don’t have a full on battle if it is not needed.
This lawyer equates her opponents’ good manners and willingness
to play by the customary rules with ethical behavior.
The Ethics: Beyond the Rules scholars observed the same
277
tendency for their informants to equate ethics with civility.
When they pushed large-firm litigators to move beyond situational
factors and define the normative standards that guide their ethical
judgments, the norms many of them identified were standards of
civility rather than standards of ultimate justice.278 Mark Suchman
characterized his observations as follows:
[L]arge-firm litigators’ . . . comments centered
predominantly on intra-professional279 obligations.
Informants generally couched these discussions in
the language of ethical pragmatism; however, by the
second weekend, many attorneys began to introduce
some (modest) normative considerations as well.
Significantly, though, even when the conversations
carried moralistic overtones, the groups showed
little interest in (or concern about) morality with a
capital “M.” Rather, large-firm litigators tended to

277. Suchman, supra note 10, at 846–47.
278. Id.
279. Id. (using the term “intra-professional” to refer to other lawyers,
particularly opposing counsel, but including colleagues within their firms).
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frame the moral challenges of intra-professional
relations as questions of “civility”—a normative
standard, to be sure, but one suggesting that the
primary consequence of violation would be
pragmatic inconvenience and tit-for-tat retribution,
280
not systemic corruption and depravity.
Suchman also reported that the informants “repeatedly
identified incivility as a central characteristic” 281 of those actors
within the system, and their firms, who they identified as most
responsible for unethical conduct. When asked to identify
proposals to elevate their firm’s professional practice, the
informants’ comments frequently were directed at increasing
282
civility. Suchman noted that “judging from the response that the
issue elicited, one could justifiably conclude that incivility would
rank at or near the top of our large-firm informants’ complaints
about the current state of litigation practice.”283
Similarly, the Ethics: Beyond the Rules litigators did not view
evasive discovery responses as unethical unless the means used to
evade responding violated the large-firm litigators’ rules of
etiquette. Suchman explained:
At the most basic level, one striking feature of our
attorneys’ comments was the extent to which they
analyzed ethical dilemmas as issues of intraprofessional miscommunication.
Repeatedly,
discovery was framed as a semiotic ritual—an
exchange of “significant gestures,” in Mead’s
terminology—between two members of a single
“discourse community.” The measure of ethical
conduct seemed to be “did the attorney send an

280. Id. at 847.
281. Id. at 848 (identifying “incivility as a central characteristic of the
profession’s purported villains (small firms, [and within large firms] lateral
hires, mid-level partners, etc”)).
282. Id.
283. Id.
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honest signal,” not “did the attorney produce the
relevant material.”284
When they frame ethics as questions of civility or sending
honest signals, the informants are separating appearances and
content, and, as within their firms, in the litigation context it is
appearances that matter most. It is not the substance of the
response, i.e., whether it is accurate and complete, that makes it
ethical, but whether the response is communicated in the
customary manner. For example, if the lawyer has decided to
evade responding, does the response send the customary signal that
the lawyer is being evasive? Large-firm litigators are concerned
with discerning and playing by the customary rules of the
adversary game and they look for opponents to do the same.
In the same vein, Suchman observed:
[T]he guiding ideal of legal professionalism [for the
informants in Ethics: Beyond the Rules] resides in
the image of a ritualized adversary contest—a
stylized confrontation in which lawyers serve as
zealous champions for good and bad causes alike,
without ever becoming so close to the principles
that they lose sight of the nobility of a game well285
played.
The stated professional ideal of the litigator informants
differed markedly from those of the in-house counsel, plaintiffs’
counsel, and judge informants the Ethics: Beyond the Rules
scholars interviewed.
The in-house counsel informants’
professional ideal was efficiency, “provid[ing] a cost-effective
vehicle for his or her client’s specific interests, and [thereby] . . .
facilitat[ing] the efficient functioning of the economy as a

284. Id. at 866, 870–71 (noting that most of the Ethics: Beyond the Rules
informants believed it was ethical to reframe a discovery request to narrow its
scope and only supply documents responsive to the reframed request as long as
the response indicates that the request has been narrowed, and thus, “‘tees up’
the issue for a motion to compel”).
285. Id. at 870–71.
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whole.”286 For the plaintiffs’ lawyer informants, “neither the honor
of the game nor the efficiency of the economy lie at the heart of the
legal ideal. Rather, the morality of the justice system rests
squarely on its ability to provide justice.”287 The scholars make
clear that plaintiffs’ lawyer informants were as pragmatic in their
approach to ethical decision-making as were the large-firm
lawyers, but they justified their tactics differently; they rationalized
their use of harassing or uncivil tactics—their means—as
288
necessary to achieve the “just” ends they claimed to advocate.
Finally, the professional ideal of the judicial informants was
finding truth.289 “[T]heir raison d’etre clearly resides in their ability
290
to facilitate the revelation of fact and the debunking of fiction.”
What distinguishes the “game well-played” ideology from the
“justice,” “truth,” and “efficient dispute resolution” ideologies is
that each of the latter incorporates a generally understood external
standard by which the morality of the justice system can be
measured. So, for example, the plaintiff’s lawyer posits certain
ends as moral, such as “gender equality,” and he acts in accordance
with his professed professional ideal when he zealously represents
a client in a gender discrimination claim seeking those ends. The
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ statement of their professional ideals, like those
of judges and in-house counsel makes reference to a widely held
value that the adversarial system purports to serve and that
arguably makes it moral.
In contrast, the large-firm litigator’s professional ideal—a
game well-played—does not incorporate any external standard that
measures the morality of the system according to the values
advanced through the real world consequences or outcomes of
litigation.291 Instead, it incorporates a standard for evaluating the
lawyer’s performance. The standard it incorporates, “wellplayed,” is defined by the large-firm litigators themselves, not by
286. Id. at 871.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 872.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Christopher Johnson discussed the idea expressed here and in the
preceding paragraph with me at length and commented on it in an earlier draft. I
am indebted to him for his insights.
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reference to any external, widely understood values. In order to
play the game well and nobly, a lawyer must understand and play
by the rules-in-use, for example, by employing appropriate
situational judgment and sending the customary signals when his
or her responses are evasive.
Large-firm litigators equate ethics with etiquette and locate
their ideal in the manner in which the game is played because the
organizational logic of large-firm bureaucracies shapes their
ethical consciousness. In a world where others decide the goals,
where right and wrong depend on whom one is working for at the
time, and understanding the rules of etiquette and what perceptions
one is expected to create is paramount, large-firm lawyers become
accustomed to placing independent value on the ability to discern
and follow the logic of the fluid organization game. The value for
them is not in the ends of the game but in their ability to
understand and play by its rules. Similarly, they locate ethics in
the way in which they conduct the conversation rather than in its
content. The large-firm litigator’s professional ideal is divorced
from the moral ends the adversarial system purports to serve;
instead it centers on the skills that make these lawyers successful
within their own firms.
If, as I have argued, the organizational logic of large-firm
bureaucracies plays a role in shaping large-firm lawyers’ views of
ethics, one would expect associates, who presumably have not
thoroughly adopted the logic of their firms, to view questions of
ethics somewhat differently than successful partners who are more
thoroughly entrenched in that logic. The Ethics: Beyond the Rules
scholars found evidence of such variations in perceptions;
292
associates saw ethical issues where partners did not. Associates
“readily acknowledged the moral dimensions of their work, but
often collapsed these into pragmatic concerns,” while partners
“tended to deny the moral dimensions of their work entirely, and to
reduce most issues to either ethical rules or pragmatic strategies.”293
When asked about what changes they might make in their firms to
address ethically problematic conduct in litigation, “partners
offered only the most minor adaptations,” while “the center of
292.
293.

See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 250, at 793–94.
Id. at 844–45.
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[associate] opinion clearly favored more significant changes in the
incentive structures of firms and in relationships with clients.”294
When the Ethics: Beyond the Rules scholars read the partners’
responses to this question to the associates, the associates’
reactions were telling. One stated:
I’m struck by the difference in perceptions. We
seem to identify more occasions that we thought
ethical issues were arising in terms of behavior and
specific issues [that firms might address.] What I’m
hearing from their responses is that there really is
nothing wrong. [Another associate said] it strikes
me that either we are wrong or they don’t see that
[pressures toward incivility or abuse] exist . . . or
they see it and they don’t care. Or they don’t
recognize it as a problem.295
I argue the latter—that the partners “don’t recognize it as a
problem.” Partners have adopted the habits of mind of the largefirm lawyer; associates are works in progress. Partners live by the
organizational logic of their firms and that logic has changed their
understandings of what it means to be ethical. Partners do not see
moral questions where associates do because partners do not
measure their conduct against internal or fixed principles; their
habit of mind is to glean expectations, to read situations, to
collapse the distinction between appearance and substance, and to
equate etiquette with ethics. The structures and incentives of large
firms encourage this; therefore, the partners do not see a problem
to be fixed.
Several associates interviewed in the Ethics: Beyond the
Rules study identified mid-level partners as the primary source of
“the pressure for borderline ethical behavior or hardball” in their
296
firms. This also suggests that the organizational logic of large294. Id. at 793.
295. Id.
296. Gordon, supra note 241, at 718 (noting that this assertion was
disputed especially by the partners interviewed in the study); Suchman, supra
note 10, at 872 (observing that large-firm lawyers identified lateral hires and
mid-level partners as the “devils within,”—the individuals within their firms
who were to blame for professional failings).
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firm bureaucracies shapes large-firm lawyers’ understandings of
ethics and lawyers’ roles. Unlike senior partners, who began their
careers before the thorough-going bureaucratization of large firms,
mid-level partners have “grown up” in large-firm bureaucracies.
They are also the lawyers who are being “squeezed,” who need to
“try to figure out what the senior partner would do and hope they
were right.” Thus, they are the large-firm lawyers who are most
likely to be thoroughly entrenched in the organizational logic of
their firms. For this reason, their conduct may be the best indicator
of the effect of bureaucratization on lawyers’ working ethics.
IX. CONCLUSION
The complicity of large-firm lawyers in recent, highly
publicized corporate scandals has spurred a new chorus of
concerns about large-firm lawyers’ ethics.
Mark Sargeant
observes “there does seem to be something that links [the lawyers
involved in these scandals]: an apparent indifference to the
297
morality of their actions.” How did the large-firm bureaucracies
where these lawyers worked shape their ethical consciousness?
Sargeant argues:
Most of the lawyers involved presumably possessed
some form of personal moral code, whether based
on religious or secular premises, as well as a
professional-role morality that should have been as
stringent in its proper sphere as any personal
morality. At a minimum, those personal and
professional moral codes would have insisted upon
truth-telling, personal integrity, concern about the
consequences of one’s actions for others,
recognition of the limitations on one’s obligation to
a client and an understanding that the “legal” is not
coextensive with the “moral.”
Those moral
priorities, however, seemed to disappear into a

297. Mark A. Sargeant, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REV. 867
nn.3–9 (2004) (describing in house and large-firm lawyer involvement in
various corporate scandals).
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smog of expediency, rationalization, willful
blindness and slavish obedience to the wishes of
self-interested managers who purported to speak for
the corporate client.298
To draw certain conclusions about the role of large-firm
bureaucracy in shaping these lawyers ethical consciousness, we
need to study lawyers who have engaged in illegal or immoral acts
on behalf of their clients or who refused to do so when asked.299
What we know now is this: the lawyers working in large law
firm bureaucracies employ a characteristic choice of norm rule to
guide them through the maze of norms through which they must
navigate every day. This choice of norm rule makes notions of
right and wrong and proper and improper entirely mutable. As a
result, the large-firm lawyer’s habit of mind is to attempt to
identify the norm appropriate to the context, rather than to judge its
merits. Moreover, this habit of mind is likely to make a thoroughgoing organizational pragmatism the large-firm lawyer’s guiding
moral principle.
The use of situational judgment, equating ethics with
etiquette, and the elevation of the skills required for success within
the organization to a professional ideal, are not problems unique to
large law firm bureaucracies. The organizational logic at work in
large firms is similar to that of America’s large corporate
bureaucracies.
In Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate
Managers, Jackall describes the habits of mind managers develop
in large corporate bureaucracies:
Bureaucratic work shapes peoples consciousness in
decisive ways. Among other things, it regularizes
peoples’ experiences of time and indeed routinizes
their lives by engaging them on a daily basis in
rational, socially approved, purposive action; it
brings them into daily proximity with subordination
to authority, creating in the process upward looking
298. Id. at 871–72.
299. The next phase of my empirical research will focus on precisely these
questions.
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stances that have decisive social and psychological
consequences; it places a premium on functionally
rational, pragmatic habit of mind that seeks specific
goals; and it creates subtle measures of prestige and
an elaborate status hierarchy that, in addition to
fostering an intense competition for status, also
makes the rules, procedures, social contexts, and
protocol
of
an
organization
paramount
300
psychological and behavioral guides.
Jackall concludes that in large corporations “morality becomes
indistinguishable from the quest for one’s own survival and
301
This is precisely what appears to be happening in
advantage.”
large law firms. The large-firm litigator’s professional ideal has
“become indistinguishable from the quest for [his] own survival
and advantage.”302 This suggests that the organizational logic at
work in large law firms is, in significant respects, a function of
their bureaucratic structures. It suggests bureaucratic work shapes
lawyers’ ethical consciousness in distinctive ways. This has
implications for all lawyers working in bureaucratic settings.
John Feerick, former Dean of the Fordham University School
of Law, recently defined integrity in the practice of law as
“[s]taying with your principles . . . holding on to who you are and
being yourself at all times as best you can . . . not giving up your
principles in order to promote yourself.”303 According to the logic
of the large law firm, however, acting with integrity, as John
Feerick defines it, may be professional suicide. Traditional notions
of integrity and professionalism assume that professionalism is not
merely a function of what makes a lawyer successful in his
particular work environment. Much of the scholarship that offers
prescriptions to “fix” lawyers’ ethics assumes lawyers will check
300. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 5–6.
301. Id. at 204.
302. Id.
303. Mary C. Daly, Teaching Integrity in the Professional Responsibility
Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 261
(2003) (quoting telephone message from John D. Feerick, Professor of Law and
former Dean of Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 3, 2003) (on file with
Mary Daly)).
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their conduct against an internal moral compass and thus have a
sense when things are ethically “amiss.”304 Consulting an internal
moral compass is foreign to the large-firm lawyers’ habit of mind.
As a result, the increasing bureaucratization of legal workplaces
poses significant challenges for the viability of traditional notions
of professionalism and prescriptions for lawyers’ ethical
shortcomings, or for any view of ethics and professionalism that
requires a lawyer to consult some internal or fixed moral calculus,
separate from the criteria for success in his workplace.

304. See, e.g., WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, A THEORY OF
LAWYER’S ETHICS (1998). Simon advocates that “[l]awyers [sh]ould take those
actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem
likely to promote justice.” Id. at 138. Simon proposes that lawyers use their
judgment to weigh their obligations as advocates and as officers to the court and
decide questions of justice. Id. at 138–39. My research suggests that the largefirm lawyer’s habit of mind is to view norms as mutable. As a result, large-firm
lawyers are not in the habit of forming their own judgments about what
constitutes justice. See also, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A
New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2003)
(advocating a rule requiring law firms to designate an in-house compliance
specialist to address ethical issues) and Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.
Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel and Other
Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002)
(describing the authors’ preliminary empirical study of large law firm
compliance specialists). As Chambliss and Wilkins note, one of the most
serious challenges to the efficacy of in-house compliance specialists in large
firms, is large-firm lawyers’ failure to recognize ethical issues when they are
confronted with them. Id. at 587. Certainly my research suggests that lawyers
who follow the large-firm choice of norm rule are unlikely to identify ethical
issues when they arise because they tend to view norms as mutable. The largefirm lawyers’ habit of mind is to ask what norm a superior or relevant peer
group would apply in the situation, not to ask if the norms are right or wrong or
to check those norms against an internal moral compass.

